


Marine Corps

JULY 1959
FORTY CENTS

Gazette



THE MARINE OFFICER'S GUIDE



Gen Gerald C. Thomas, USMC (Ret)

Col R. D. Heinl, Jr., USMC

RAdm A. A. Ageton, USN (Ret)

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Marine Corps Gazette

JULY 1959
NUMBER 7
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THIS MONTH'S COVER The cover illustration, designed by AGySgt Robert F. Fleischauer, is a representation of a 1798 Marine bandsman.

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
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
Fred T. Stolley

Opinions expressed in the Gazette do not necessarily reflect the attitude of the Navy Department nor of Headquarters, United States Marine Corps




Bell Telephone scientists working on Nike-Hercules missile guidance system.

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In addition, a radio-inertial guidance system for the Titan intercontinental ballistic missile is being

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
... I'm not an artilleryman of the Iwo Jima era and I won't advocate the methods used in those "good old days," but I must disagree wholeheartedly with Capt Keith (*OBSERVATION POST*, Apr '59) on several points and especially with his solution to the problem of "gunnery ground rules."

The US Army Artillery and Missile School, Fort Sill, Okla., does provide Marine artillerymen with a wealth of gunnery. In order to provide a common ground on which all this knowledge can be put to use, the school has adopted a system. This system is the result of the efforts of the whole staff contributing their ideas of the best system. Every staff member may not agree completely with the result. The student should leave the school with the understanding that the school system is only a system but that the principles he has learned must be the basis of any system. He should apply these principles to whatever system is desired by his commanding officer. Very often, if a Marine has had little experience prior to attending the school, he will leave with the impression that the school system is the only system. He should be able to continue learning and maturing his views by working with his unit's system.

The "gunnery ground rules" of a particular unit need not affect greatly its ability to work with other units. Capt Keith mentioned the fact that a battery may be separated from its parent unit and sent to work with another unit. In this case, most likely, this battery would contain weapons of a different caliber than those of the unit it joins and, therefore, would be producing its own firing data and able to use its own system. In any case, a unit whose

personnel are thoroughly trained in the principles of gunnery can easily adapt itself to any specific system.

The gunnery "bible," FM 6-40, mentioned by Capt Keith should be the basic reference for principles and for *suggested* techniques. Several of the techniques which were in favor at the school when FM 6-40 was written have since been changed. These changes will be published. Often this FM will yield only a general or vague answer to a specific question and thus leave the inquirer



to his own common sense solution. The common-sense solution should be based on the unchanging principles taught by the school and set forth in the manual.

Capt Keith's two examples of "gunnery ground rules" deserve mention in that they are somewhat faulty and may actually help prove my point of view.

First, on a battalion observed fire chart, the school and FM 6-40 teach that subsequent to initial registrations, the batteries are back plotted from the common registration point. This is the most simple, but not necessarily the only method. The registration point could be plotted

from one of the batteries as may normally be done on a battery observed fire chart. However, I can't understand how some organizations "teach and practice just the opposite." That would mean that the registration point would be established by plotting it from each battery. Try it.

Second, illumination is not registered but is adjusted. It is, according to FM 6-40, "adjusted by using standard observed fire procedure" (on the observer-target line). Looking further in FM 6-40, we find that "fuze and elevation . . . are determined from the appropriate firing table" (a GFT has not been accepted as standard). A graphical firing table was produced and is used at the school even though it isn't standard. It certainly is a method for doing away with the time consuming tabular firing table computations.

The Marine Corps doesn't need a high-powered board to promulgate policies and techniques, thereby tending to stifle initiative. It does need well-informed artillerymen, officers versed in basic principles and with the insight and initiative to devise the best system for their own circumstance.

Capt R. L. Belli

Dept of Gunnery
US Army Artillery and Missile School
Fort Sill, Okla.

Eyes in the Sky


... Thanks to Capt Spiro for his article *TAO plus You* (*GAZETTE*, May '59) which publicized the famous VMO. I have waited 8 years for an article about observation squadrons.

In the opening page the author indicated that ground units seldom use observation aircraft. May I emphasize that Recon Co, 1stMarDiv made use of these planes while performing motorized and foot patrols during the early months of the fighting in Korea.

On 1 Nov 50 Recon Co conducted a motor patrol to Huksu-ri which was more than 30 miles beyond the nearest friendly unit and beyond range of communications and supporting fire. After reaching its objective, the patrol exchanged small arms fire

(Continued on page 6)

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[Continued from page 4]

with the enemy. Just when the patrol needed information about the surrounding terrain, the AO reported location, strength and movements of the enemy in the immediate area. He also relayed a request for an air strike which arrived in short order. Further, he was able to inform the patrol of the presence of the Chinese Communist's 124th Div 22 miles to the east. Again, during CCF counterattacks in April and May '51, Recon Co conducted motor patrols deep beyond UN lines into unfamiliar territory. Here observation planes watched for possible enemy encirclement, reported enemy activity and called in air strikes when necessary.

These are only a few instances where TAO sections assisted Recon. Many times the pilots flew at tree-top level to point out enemy positions to the patrols.

Some units *have* made maximum use of TAO sections, and they will be needed more in future wars when combat teams will be widely dispersed.

Paul G. Martin


8869 20th Ave.
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Cleanest Tractors Anywhere

... After reading the article *We Can Double The Training Week*, by LtCol T. N. Greene (GAZETTE, Mar '59) I feel I must write you my feelings about it. Never in my life of reading military publications have I read so much logic and sound judgment as contained in LtCol Greene's article. In plain words, he has hit the nail right on its head.

While a regular Marine and a member of an amphibious tractor company, I became so disgusted with the Corps that I got out at the end of my enlistment. So much time was wasted in half-prepared classes and at the tractor park cleaning tractors without any cleaning gear that I felt a career in the Marines was equally wasteful. My family is composed of military men of some shape or form and I have had some contact with the military for the past 8 years. So you see there was a good chance I would have stayed with it had not my time been wasted on ill-prepared training schedules. A great number of NCOs in my unit felt the same way as I did. Just as LtCol Greene

wrote, much of our time was spent sitting in classrooms, listening to dull lectures on familiar subjects, or hiding from the GySgt because we were supposed to be cleaning tractors and had nothing to do the job with. Also, cleaning parked tractors, day in and day out for months gets pretty much routine. Interest is lost after awhile and the Marine begins to wonder what happened to



the top-notch training the recruiting sergeant promised him.

In August I am returning to my first love, the regular Marines. I hope by that time LtCol Greene's article will have shaken someone, somewhere, and my return will be a happy one. Congratulations on a fine professional magazine for professional soldiers. Hope to see more articles like the one referred to.

Sgt D. F. Hall

51st Inf Co
Flint, Mich.

Take It or Leave It

... For a number of years I have observed the rush each year for requests for leave during the month of June. June appears to be a popular month for requesting leave primarily because: 1) June is the month that children normally get out of school, and 2) leave in excess of 60 days accrued must be taken by 1 July or lost. Because of this increase in the number of leave requests for June, many officers and enlisted men are unable to use up their authorized leave prior to 1 July.

Enlisted men are paid at the expiration of enlistment for unused leave up to 60 days accrued. However, officers are paid only for the un-

used leave upon retirement or release from active duty. Personally, I have averaged losing 13 to 15 days each year during my nearly 18 years' service in the Marine Corps. This is not a complaint since I consider maximum leave should be granted only when duty permits, but I do believe the leave situation can be improved. I am sure other officers are of the same opinion.

I believe that this problem can be eased considerably by changing the cut-off date for determining leave credits from 30 June to 31 December, in other words, from fiscal year to calendar year. This would prevent the last-minute rush for leave in June and allow personnel to use up leave during the Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays when children are home from school and when most commands normally operate on reduced strength.

LtCol C. A. Sachs

Staff, FMFLant
Norfolk, Va.

TV for Recon

... All of us today are aware of the tremendous potential of television in intelligence and recon work. The working apparatus of a TV transmitter has been reduced to pack size and many of our hot news releases are telecast in this manner throughout the nation. Why, then, cannot a workable method be employed in utilizing this method by such a unit as a ForceReconCo? I'll wager it can be done and here is one idea how.

During the last year the TV industry has developed an improved system of "video tape" which works like this:

A telecast is made and beamed to a reproduction unit which operates in the same manner as making a sound recording on tape. The reproduction unit receives the telecast, reproduces the image on a 2½-inch-wide tape and develops it almost simultaneously.

The transistor transmitter approximates the size of a 16mm movie camera. The portable power reproduction unit has been reduced to approximately 2½ x 1 x 1 feet and weighs between 200 and 300 lbs. The mechanics of reproduction are too involved to be covered here, but it will suffice to say that the time it

(Continued on page 8)

BY REAR ADMIRAL BRUCE McCANDLESS, U.S.N. (RET.),
CAPTAIN BROOKS J. HARRAL, U.S.N., ORETHA D. SWARTZ
FOREWORD BY VICE ADMIRAL ROBERT B. PIRIE, U.S.N.

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
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A few of the problems in the booklet require a lot of math. Some require only logic and there are certainly many that will intrigue you. **THE ANSWERS ARE ALL IN THE BACK PAGES.** Send the coupon today!


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(Continued from page 6)

takes to reproduce the video tape is not more than a few seconds. Military adaptation could possibly be done this way:

A pathfinder, amphibious, or para-recon team is dropped or placed in whatever area deemed necessary to the operation. Equipped with portable transmitters, they could take the area under observation and transmit their findings in a matter of seconds or minutes to an overhead observation plane equipped with micro-wave receiver and reproduction unit where it would be received and taped. At night an infra-red videcon camera could be used.

The plane need remain in the area only long enough for the telecast. Tapes could be developed en-route back to the CP. Another method which could be used is to drop the team at a given point where telecasts could be made for as long and take in as much territory as necessary. Telecasts could be reproduced immediately and the tapes picked up under cover of darkness by submarine or helicopter.

Capt J. W. Duncan

1&1, 89th Inf Co
Columbia, S. C.

Could Be the Shape of the Head


... In the past few years we have had many uniform changes for both officers and enlisted. Despite the controversy over many of these changes, it is my belief that the end justifies the means. However, I also believe that before changing the style of uniforms we should police the uniforms we are presently wearing. For more than 5 years I have been waging a one-man war against the "flat-hat" worn by a goodly 50 per cent of the young Marines who change the intended shape of a regulation frame cap by bending the grommet. The result resembles in appearance a sailor's "flat hat."

Recently, a Marine who wore his frame cap in the above described fashion was picked as "Marine of the Month." If COs condone this uniform, how can staff NCOs and junior NCOs correct their men?

Along with "flat-hats" we have Windsor knots, double-soled shoes, etc. I propose that we clean up the present wearing of the uniform before making any more changes.

AMSgt B. M. Rosoff

6104 Buckskin St.
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
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Ed: One year ago this month Marines went ashore in Lebanon. This account of the landings, written for Gazette readers, contains only that political background considered necessary for an understanding of the military aspects of the operation.

LEBANON, REFERRED TO IN THE Bible as the "Land of Milk and Honey," early in 1958 became a land of strife and chaos. The desperate struggle to maintain her way of life became a symbolic example to free nations, large and small, whose freedom and independence may in the future be threatened. The prompt assistance given her by the US proved to the world that we would support our friends with determination in the cause of freedom, even against the threat of global conflict by the Soviet Bloc. But most important, this demonstration brought peace to the country split by externally supported revolution.

Operation BLUEBAT, the code name for the Lebanon operation, now represents a new chapter in history, written with pride and held in the memory of all who participated in it. Although not an actual combat situation, it was a true test of many of our present concepts and techniques and had sufficient realism to warrant review in some detail. There was



much experience gained and there were many lessons learned in this operation which will greatly benefit all Marines. From a professional aspect, we are all interested or should be, in learning from the experiences of the other fellow. Therefore, it is my endeavor to present an overall look at the operation from my personal experience and then describe from a "lessons learned" point of view some of the intelligence, operational and logistical problems and how we solved them.

In order to provide a proper setting I shall review the more important events leading up to the landing of US Forces in Lebanon.

Internal political pressures in 1958 encouraged by outside influence brought growing tension to Lebanon. In May the tensions erupted into an armed insurrection against the government.


Lebanon is strategically located at the eastern end of the Mediterranean on a strip of land 120 miles long and 30 miles wide and bounded on the

North and East by Syria and on the South by Israel. This small country with a population of only one and a half million, had her independence threatened internally by strong and numerous rebel bands, most of which were strengthened from abroad in such a fashion as to constitute a readily exploitable and unified fifth column. Along the borders of Lebanon, armed forces of Syria were poised in strength on the two invasion routes used for thousands of years from Syria to Beirut.

Capitalizing on the inherent religious division of Lebanon, which is half Moslem and half Christian, the insurgents were able to bring about a series of riots and strikes predominantly among the Moslem element. An important factor in the unrest was disagreement with the policies and plans of the existing legal government headed by President Camile Chamoun. These riots and strikes received encouragement, guidance and financial support from abroad. Arms, ammunition, money and volunteers

flowing into Lebanon helped to bring about the resultant open rebellion.

The Chamoun government appealed to the Security Council of the United Nations and, as a result, a United Nations Observer Group was sent to determine the amount of aid coming from the U.A.R. from Syria. Since the rebels allowed the observers to patrol the border only in specific areas and at specific times their reports were ineffective and inconclusive and the rebellion continued with unrestrained success. President Chamoun alerted the US that, as a last resort, he would ask for assistance. In preparation for a possible request the Commander, Amphibious Group Two, the CG, Second Provisional Marine Force and staffs were flown to the Mediterranean to assume command of Task Forces 61 and 62, the Navy and Marine amphibious elements of the Sixth Fleet, and to prepare plans for possible landings in the Mideast area. The Amphibious Task Forces proceeded to the Eastern Mediterranean and



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
Lebanon is strategically located at the eastern end of the Mediterranean on a strip of land 120 miles long and 30 miles wide and bounded on the

North and East by Syria and on the South by Israel. This small country with a population of only one and a half million, had her independence threatened internally by strong and numerous rebel bands, most of which were strengthened from abroad in such a fashion as to constitute a readily exploitable and unified fifth column. Along the borders of Lebanon, armed forces of Syria were poised in strength on the two invasion routes used for thousands of years from Syria to Beirut.

Capitalizing on the inherent religious division of Lebanon, which is half Moslem and half Christian, the insurgents were able to bring about a series of riots and strikes predominantly among the Moslem element. An important factor in the unrest was disagreement with the policies and plans of the existing legal government headed by President Camile Chamoun. These riots and strikes received encouragement, guidance and financial support from abroad. Arms, ammunition, money and volunteers

flowing into Lebanon helped to bring about the resultant open rebellion.

The Chamoun government appealed to the Security Council of the United Nations and, as a result, a United Nations Observer Group was sent to determine the amount of aid coming from the U.A.R. from Syria. Since the rebels allowed the observers to patrol the border only in specific areas and at specific times their reports were ineffective and inconclusive and the rebellion continued with unrestrained success. President Chamoun alerted the US that, as a last resort, he would ask for assistance. In preparation for a possible request the Commander, Amphibious Group Two, the CG, Second Provisional Marine Force and staffs were flown to the Mediterranean to assume command of Task Forces 61 and 62, the Navy and Marine amphibious elements of the Sixth Fleet, and to prepare plans for possible landings in the Mideast area. The Amphibious Task Forces proceeded to the Eastern Mediterranean and



Initial Objective: Beirut International Airport


commenced an operation of "wait and see."

The rebellion in Lebanon became a stalemate characterized by sporadic activity and terrorist acts by the

rebels and by tactics of delay and containment by the government forces. The strikes continued and the normally prosperous country was feeling the pain of economic strangu-

lation. Her plight drew less and less international attention and it appeared that the operations for the country might not materialize. After the frantic planning, conferring, ship deployment and redeployment, re-planning and altering of emergency plans this relatively slack period seemed to provide an almost anticlimactic aura for the mission of the Second Provisional Marine Force.

Soon, however, all the free world was startled from this lull by a new and even greater crisis—the forcible overthrow of the government of Iraq on 14 July. Reacting immediately, President Chamoun requested US troop support, as he logically feared Lebanon would suffer a similar fate. He did not have long to wait. The order came from the US Chief of Naval Operations to be prepared for possible landings the following day, 15 July. This warning order was followed almost immediately by the order to "land the Marines." H-Hour was set for 1500 Beirut time on 15 July by Washington, a bit unusual and unprecedented perhaps, but necessary in order to allow the announcement of our action to the United Nations to coincide with the



Disposition of units when landing was directed

time that the Marines actually hit the beach.

At the time the order was received, we had three battalion landing teams in the Mediterranean embarked in the shipping of three amphibious transport squadrons. Actually our operation plan called for only two BLT's and two TransPhibRons but the extra forces then available provided us with a considerable advantage should there have been any opposition ashore. However, the tactical positioning of our units afloat was not exactly ideal, emphasizing the problems of conducting an operation on such short notice. TransPhibRon 4 with BLT 1/8 embarked, having been relieved on 12 July by TransPhibRon 2 with BLT 3/6 embarked, was southeast of Italy proceeding toward Gibraltar. TransPhibRon 6, with BLT 2/2 embarked, was located within 12 hours steaming distance from Beirut. The LSD, *USS Plymouth Rock*, of TransPhibRon 6 was approaching Malta, where she was to undergo emergency repairs. Also CTF 61, now RAdm Yeager, ComPhibGru 4 and 1 were aboard the AGC, *USS Pocono*, with TransPhibRon 2 enroute to Athens.

Although TransPhibRon 6 was in its proper position, 12 hours from Beirut, the possibility of its arriving in sufficient time to unload its boats, disembark the Marines, and then cross the line of departure prior to H-Hour was, at least, problematical. Even at this late hour we still did not know whether the landing would be opposed. However, BLT 2/2, commanded by LtCol H. A. Hadd, was to be landed with the assumption that it would be able to cope with whatever might develop. I was informed that BLT 3/6, commanded by LtCol R. M. Jenkins, would arrive in the objective area in time to land during the early morning hours of 16 July. In addition, BLT 1/8, commanded by LtCol J. H. Brickley, its return to the US interrupted for the second time, was scheduled to arrive off Lebanon the morning of 18 July.

By noon on 15 July we were all very much relieved when ComTransPhibRon 6 informed CTF 61, Commander, Amphibious Task Force 61 and me that his squadron would make H-Hour as ordered. The first wave of BLT 2/2 crossed the line of departure at 1500 and hit Red Beach



Conference to discuss entry of Marines into Beirut

at 1504, slightly off schedule, but in light of the short time in which the landing was ordered, it was an exceptionally well executed operation. There was no opposition encountered and the primary objective—Beirut International Airport—was secured within an hour. The only incident detracting from the polished performance of the assaulting Marines as they half-ran, half-waded to the beach was the overzealous welcome given them by the friendly Lebanese. Instead of enemy forces—Lebanese children; in place of enemy armor—soft drink carts. It was truly a new chapter to add to the annals of the Corps.

Perhaps the most important and crucial day of the entire operation was 16 July and the events which occurred certainly emphasized the complexities which may be encountered by a military commander in a political-military situation such as existed in Lebanon. The tactical plan for the day was as follows: upon the completion of its landing BLT 3/6 was to relieve BLT 2/2 of responsibility for the security of the airfield, whereupon BLT 2/2 would move by armored column into the port area of Beirut and establish security for these important facilities. With port security established our AGC command ships, *USS Pocono* and *USS Taconic*, could then enter

the harbor safely. I arrived in the area at dawn on 16 July and accompanied RAdm Yeager to the *USS Taconic* to meet with Adm Holloway, Commander-in-Chief, Specified Command, Middle East, who arrived a few hours earlier by air. He instructed me to meet with Ambassador McClintock at the US Embassy in Beirut later in the morning. I went ashore just as Marines of the first wave of BLT 3/6 were crossing Red Beach and conferred with my battalion commanders. After instructing them to carry out the plan as previously outlined, I continued to the embassy to keep my appointment with the Ambassador. At that time I learned from Mr. McClintock the extent of the explosive situation as it existed. Gen Chehab, Commander-in-Chief of the Lebanese Armed Forces, expressed his fears regarding the safety of our troops and of the Lebanese during the movement of our forces towards the city of Beirut. He desired to know in detail our intentions and plans. He requested of the Ambassador that our column of armor be halted indefinitely. At the request of the Ambassador, I ordered the column to delay temporarily until further orders and then proceeded with the Ambassador to the presidential palace where I presented the proposed scheme of maneuver to President Chamoun. The



Lead tank of armored column proceeding through city

President agreed with our plan in its entirety and urged that it be carried out as soon as possible. I immediately issued orders for the column to resume the advance into the city.

On returning to the embassy, we learned that Lebanese armor units had been moved to strategic points along the route planned for our column to follow into the city. It was imperative that any incident with the forces we were assisting be prevented if at all possible and, therefore, I decided to return to my helicopter at the airport and from there to report the events to Adm Holloway on board ship. In the meantime the Ambassador intended to contact Gen Chehab concerning the tanks and the positions assumed by the Lebanese Forces.

Arriving at the head of the column, I ordered another delay of 30 minutes to allow the situation to clarify and to permit time to negotiate for the removal of the Lebanese armor by the Ambassador. When I reached the airport I was informed

that Adm Holloway and RAdm Yeager were on their way from the ship by helicopter. As soon as they arrived we departed for the embassy, but as we passed the halted column we saw the Ambassador's car, flags flying, approaching from the direction of the city and with him in the car was Gen Chehab. At the head of the column we discussed the situation with Gen Chehab briefly and then moved to the office of a nearby military school. Gen Chehab informed us of rebel strongpoints requiring removal before we could proceed, and finally requested that we take another route to the port which would require an additional hour. This last request entailed the crossing of 500 yards of soft sand and ultimately would have delayed us for the rest of the day. I explained to him that when we landed we were prepared to cope with any situation which might develop including being fired upon and although we appreciated his desire to protect us from rebel fire, we could delay no longer but must proceed to carry out our orders. The

Ambassador suggested that he, Adm Holloway and Gen Chehab lead the column into the city with no more delay and Gen Chehab agreed. RAdm Yeager and I followed in the second car. The movement started at 1230 and after many more delays was completed at approximately 1500. Immediately BLT 2/2 established security around the port area and other key installations within the city. In summation of the day's events it appears, although our movement was delayed considerably, that negotiation and moral suasion possibly prevented a very serious situation from erupting.

On the following day, 17 July, I met with Gen Chehab in his home at Jounie, 12 miles north of Beirut, to discuss the position of the Lebanese Army in relation to our forces. He desired that we redeploy our units to dispel the idea that the city was being occupied, emphasizing that he wished to prevent any contact between our forces and the opposition. Finally, he suggested some sort of liaison between the Lebanese

Army and my headquarters and each of the Marine Battalions. In reply to Gen Chehab I stated that our troops were in Lebanon at the invitation of the legal government and that our government had sent the number of troops it felt necessary to provide the assistance promised. I further emphasized that we had come in a spirit of friendly assistance and desired to cooperate fully with the Lebanese Army and help them in every way possible and would certainly welcome liaison officers from the Lebanese Army. I added that we were confident that the Lebanese Army could handle any rebel outbreak, but that we were prepared to assist them whenever and wherever necessary. In regard to the disposition of our troops, I stated that in order to accomplish our mission and, until assured by the Lebanese Government that the city was secure from attack, we must occupy certain key positions in and around the city, but would attempt to redeploy our units so as to dispel the idea that the city was being occupied.

As a result of the discussion we were able to establish liaison by having a Lebanese officer serve with my staff, and each of the battalions. This arrangement provided a high degree of cooperation between our forces. This initial conference with Gen Chehab was most profitable and contributed greatly to the reduction of the tension which existed at this time.

On D-Day I assumed the title of Commander, American Land Forces, and remained such throughout the initial phases of the operation until relieved by MajGen Adams, US Army on 26 July. A reinforcing Army element, the 24th Airborne Brigade, under command of BGen Gray, US Army, completed landing via air on 19 July, the day after the initial elements of our airlifted battalion, 2/8, arrived. The airborne brigade assumed the role of reserve and was billeted in the historic olive groves south of Beirut around the international airport. They remained in this status until Gen Adams assumed overall command.

On 21 July I again met with Gen Chehab at the Lebanese Army Headquarters. At this meeting he stated that it was his desire that the Lebanese Army cope with the Basta, the



Moving out to establish security around port area

opposition-controlled area of Beirut, and that he intended to compress the area and control avenues of ingress and egress, thereby preventing a bloody battle. From his remarks it appeared quite clear to me that the real concern of Gen Chehab at the time of our initial advance into the city was for fear the Marines would march directly into the Basta area, thereby destroying completely his plans on how best to deal with this sensitive situation. He further stated that he was placing Lebanese units between US positions and rebel positions in order to prevent incidents with our forces. In answer to my question he replied that the situation had improved considerably subsequent to the arrival of US assistance and the flow of money, arms, and people over the border had been reduced.

Through this discussion we were able to establish integrated military police patrols consisting of men from the Lebanese Army, the US Army, Marine Corps and Navy. Each patrol of four men, riding in a jeep, patrolled various sections of the city and in addition to offering further security had a strong psychological effect on the Lebanese civilians in proving to them that our forces were cooperating and working toward a common goal.

During the course of our discussion it was quite apparent that Gen Chehab, assured that we were in

Lebanon only to assist and not to conquer, was willing to cooperate fully with us and, as later events proved, continued this spirit throughout our stay.

For the next two and one half months the situation was static and we continued to hold various defensive positions in and around the city of Beirut. Throughout this period there was very little rebel activity encountered, but our units remained alert and ready to move at any time. Comprehensive training and recreational programs were carried out to the maximum allowed by our mission. Liberty was granted daily in Beirut to 15 per cent of personnel three weeks after the landings; overnight visits to the resort hotels in the mountains were arranged, both items improving morale and efficiency. The thousands of dollars spent by servicemen on liberty contributed substantially to the economic stability in the then almost destitute Beirut area.

The political-military situation, as previously discussed, presented many problems seldom encountered by Marine units in the past. From this situation many lessons were learned which will be of value in any future operation of this type. As intelligence, operations and logistics are of utmost importance to a military commander, I will give in detail some of the problems and lessons learned in these categories.



Providing security for Ambassador's home



USS Pocono and USS Taconic in Beirut harbor



Watchful alert from observation post

Intelligence

In the planning phase of the operation we lacked up-to-date beach surveys of the coast of Lebanon and it was necessary, therefore, to select the landing beaches by use of intelligence publications and aerial photographs. Although the selection was the best available for Red Beach over which BLT 2/2 landed to secure the initial objective, more data concerning the characteristics of the beach would have been of great help. The photographs indicated trafficability would be poor and, upon landing, conditions proved to be even worse than anticipated, slowing the unloading process significantly. Although it was known that there was an off-shore sandbar, lack of UDT reconnaissance prevented its pinpoint location and as a result the beaching of the heavier landing craft was hampered.

The fact that the underwater demolition unit was on board the *USS Plymouth Rock*, in addition to limited time available prior to H-Hour, precluded beach surveys prior to the assault. Had a physical pre-H-Hour survey been conducted, the poor characteristics of the beach would have been compensated for and the delay perhaps prevented.

As H-Hour approached and the first waves of landing craft crossed the line of departure, little was known concerning the potential opposition, if any, which faced us ashore. Our information as to the size and location of the opposition groups later proved to be quite accurate, but the complexities of the political-military structure of Lebanon made any attempt at accurate prediction of the future impractical. Also, the powerful forces poised on the Lebanese borders remained a strong factor in this indeterminate picture. Although in any landing of this type the unknown will always exist, close liaison with our embassy, established prior to arrival in a foreign country, would assist greatly in constructing an accurate appraisal of the political-military situation as well as confirming geophysical data.

No combat situation developed in Lebanon but the unrest prevailed in the form of a continuous series of political-military-religious crises. The many political and religious factions present within the country consti-

tuted a highly interesting and intriguing study from the intelligence aspect. Each group possessed varying motives for its existence, but most aligned with either the pro-government or opposition forces. All contributed to the overwhelming undercurrent of distrust and subterfuge which flowed continuously. Contact was established and maintained with these and other groups through the operation by the intelligence personnel, assisting us in keeping abreast of the rapidly changing political climate. Close liaison with the Army Headquarters, the American Embassy and the Lebanese Government Forces provided accurate and timely information of events as they occurred.

During the latter part of July and during the month of August our area remained relatively quiet. Bombing and sniping activities of the opposition elements plus ethnic factions such as the Armenians with their internal dissension, kept the population and government forces in a constant state of tension.

During this period, tighter security measures were adopted, including security checks of all installations. Unit S-2's supervised passive counter-intelligence activity with particular stress laid on camouflage discipline. Since no "enemy forces" were to develop, the intelligence thinking drifted toward active and passive measures to provide military security within the Landing Force. The Second Provisional Marine Force maintained a position of watchful alert from observation posts at critical positions throughout the city. Patrols probed deeply into outlying villages for opposition activity and to determine attitudes of the local population.

The first three weeks of September remained quiet throughout our sector; however, the latter part of the month proved to be perhaps as interesting from an intelligence point of view as the landing itself. Sometime on Friday, 19 September, a Christian-dominated political faction called the Phalange Kataeb became aroused over the kidnapping of the editor of their local newspaper by members of the Basta opposition group. Street barricades went up. The Phalange directed their strike and merchants were forcibly urged not to bring their produce to the

Beirut markets, and Phalange roadblocks ringed portions of the city. The strike continued during the inauguration day of the President—Chehab—on 23 September.

On the evening of 24 September the appointment was announced of Rashid Karami, the former leader of the Moslem opposition in Tripoli, as Prime Minister. Almost immediately, new tensions arose and the curfew was re-imposed.

Although barricades remained, within the next two days the crowds grew less severe and in less frequency and by Sunday, 28 September, it appeared that Beirut was in a relative state of "calm." The attitude of the opposition throughout this period was a cautious non-participating role of surveillance. Suddenly, on the same day, the sound of small arms fire shattered the calm of downtown Beirut. The trouble began when elements of the Lebanese Army, attempting to eliminate a Phalange roadblock, were met with Phalange resistance. Shortly thereafter two Phalange were dead and several wounded by the Lebanese soldiers. Immediately the angered Phalangists retreated to their headquarters for reinforcements. Once again the dispute was regenerated with the Phalangists sniping at Lebanese soldiers from the roof tops as the Lebanese Army returned the fire at the Phalangists from the streets below. Bullets ricocheted off our command ships only three blocks away. At the same time, from the fringe of the Basta, the opposition elements were shooting at both the Phalange and the Lebanese Army troops. At this time a determination of who was friend and who was foe was exceedingly difficult.

At the time of our departure the Phalange had begun to set up their own barricaded area within the city, corresponding to the rebel quarter. In effect, the Phalange, who for so long had fought to defeat the opposition, were now a new type of opposition.

As we prepared to depart Lebanon it was clear to us that there would be more internal violence before the political situation would actually be stabilized. But most significant was the new attitude of the Lebanese Army. They now struck at both sides of the dissension—old and new opposition — and appeared capable

of handling their own problems.

In reflection, there are probably many intelligence experiences to be recounted but the primary factor that stands out to be emphasized was the lack of qualified linguists in the Second Provisional Marine Force. Utilization of local sources as interpreters in a political turmoil such as existed in Lebanon is undesirable. At best, due to the personal political and religious alignment, reliability of the populace would be questionable. The operation emphasized the need within the Marine Corps for qualified linguists to be available for employment with "brush fire" forces in all areas of possible commitment.

Operations

BLUEBAT was a well planned, well executed operation which encompassed the combined efforts of the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. I indicated previously that BLT 2/2 landed over Red Beach on D-Day and secured the Beirut International Airport south of the city. The landing was hampered by lack of Marine Shore Party and Naval Beach Group personnel embarked aboard the LSD *Plymouth Rock* which, as previously mentioned, had been enroute to Malta for repairs. The absence of these essential personnel impeded the unloading of supplies and the establishment of dumps ashore, a situation which could have been serious had any opposition been met. Although naval gunfire and air support were readily available during this crucial phase, the battalion lacked the close fire support of tanks and artillery which were also loaded aboard the LSD *Plymouth Rock*. This was a serious deficit since the possibility of intervention by other powers was the greatest at this time. Less than three hours from Beirut, powerful armored forces equipped with modern Russian tanks represented a formidable threat to our mission. Fortunately they did not actively enter into our operation. Unloading continued and twelve hours after the first Marine hit the beach, three M-48 tanks were landed from a TransPhibRon 6 LST by causeway, since the gentle gradient of the beach precluded the beaching of the LST. Soon thereafter, five more tanks and badly needed shore party and beach group elements were



Motorized patrol escorted by helicopter

landed from the LSD, *USS Fort Snelling*, which had been dispatched ahead for TransPhibRon 2. By the following morning the armored and logistic support was adequate to meet the immediate needs of the force ashore. It was quite apparent that the problems encountered in this initial phase were due to the very short notice which we received to effect the landing. We can surmise that had the threat of strong opposition been greater, the selection of H-Hour would have been determined more by tactical, and less by political considerations.

Although outside intervention failed to materialize, the availability of even a limited number of tanks added significantly to the security of our position during this phase. The nature of the outside threat emphasizes that we cannot yet afford to neglect armor in our drive to build a helicopter-transportable, nuclear-equipped FMF.

The build-up of troops and equipment continued as BLT 3/6 landed over Red Beach on the morning of D+1 and assumed responsibility for the security of the airport, allowing BLT 2/2 to proceed into the port area of the city to secure the dock facilities. On D+3 BLT 1/8 landed over Yellow Beach, north of Beirut and secured positions in the northeast sector. On D+3 first elements of the airlifted battalion, 2/8, arrived and moved aboard ships to assist in the general unloading which com-

menced over Yellow Beach the same day. The HRS helicopter sub-unit of HMR 262 moved ashore on D+4 and, although consisting of only 8 HRS helicopters, provided valuable reconnaissance, emergency air evacuation, liaison and logistic support. On D+4 also, the 1st Airborne Battle Group of the 187th Infantry was air-transported into Beirut, roughly 2000 strong. First elements of the Battle Group's sea-tail arrived on D+7 and commenced a build-up which in five days time brought the total army troops present to over 8000, including a tank battalion of 72 M-48 tanks, while the total of the Marine force remained at about 6000. The combined Army and Marine forces then were strong enough to cope with any foreseeable situation which was likely to develop. On 26 July, 2/8 assumed responsibility for the port area security and security of key facilities within the city from BLT 2/2 which then assumed the role of force reserve.

During the balance of the operation the major tactical changes of Marine units were: the relief by the 24th Airborne Brigade on 29 July of BLT 3/6, which redeployed to the southern flank of BLT 1/8; the embarkation of BLT 2/2 in mid-August, and of BLT 1/8 together with 2/8 in mid-September. BLT 2/2 remained a floating reserve while BLT 1/8 at last steamed for home after being delayed on two occasions.

On the last day of July, Gen Che-

hab was elected President of the Republic but was not scheduled to be inaugurated until the latter part of September. Although the tenseness throughout Lebanon was reduced by the election, the strike continued and sporadic rebel activity remained in evidence.

On the 10th of September a joint Marine-Army amphibious exercise was held near J'Bail, Lebanon, 20 miles north of Beirut. The landing was on a small scale, involving a reinforced Marine rifle company in amphibious assault and a helicopter-borne company from the Airborne Battle Group, utilizing both Army and Marine helicopters. The exercise received wide publicity and more than 5000 Lebanese gathered in the beach area to see the amtracs crawl ashore and two LCUs beach with ontos, tractors, and other vehicles. As the ontos rolled ashore Lebanese Army officers, who were observers, rode on top and were cheered wildly by the crowds on the beach. It was a festive occasion for the Lebanese and a well-publicized demonstration of our capability to extend our operations wherever it might be necessary.

On 23 September Gen Chehab was inaugurated and, as discussed earlier, violence did occur from dissident elements. Although the strikes continued it appeared on 28 September that the situation was calm enough to allow the one remaining BLT, 3/6, to commence backload-

ing as planned. Also on the 28th, RLT 6 Headquarters and BLT 2/6 arrived in Beirut. By 30 September the last Marine of BLT 3/6 boarded ship and the RLT staff completed the relief of my staff, allowing us to return home after almost a full 3-month Mediterranean tour.

Air support requirements for the operation were effectively met by carrier based aircraft of the Sixth Fleet and to a lesser extent by Air Force aircraft based in Turkey. Primary employment consisted of visual and photographic reconnaissance and on station alert. Considerable training was derived from the exercise of control of close support aircraft by the 2dProvMarFor air control organization.

In light of the quiet tactical situation ashore, the absence of Marine fixed wing air support was felt primarily in the lack of opportunity for Marine air-ground teamwork. In active combat operations, Marine air support would have been invaluable not only because of its effectiveness against enemy ground elements, but also because of the superior ability




BGen Wade assumed command of the 2dProvMarForce, FMFLant, on 10 Jan '58. Less than 7 months later, on 15 July, the unit went ashore at Beirut. The General remained in command of Marine Forces in Lebanon throughout the operation and was awarded the DSM for his services. Entering the Marine Corps in 1928, he was commissioned in 1933 and has served as CO, 1st Marines; Head, Plans Branch, G-3, HQMC; and CG, Force Troops, FMFLant. Formerly ADC, 2dMar Div, he is now CG, MCB, Camp Lejeune.

of the air-ground team to pinpoint actual targets, thereby minimizing destruction and loss of life in an essentially friendly area. Had the situation developed into a combat operation, it would have been almost essential to have, available to the Landing Force, Marine fixed wing air support and a helicopter-lift capability of at least a reinforced company. In addition, the limited number of beaches in Lebanon and other Mideast areas capable of supporting a major amphibious landing make the vertical envelopment necessary in maintaining speed and mobility

and in providing versatility in the choice of tactics by the Landing Force Commander. These could be important considerations in event of "limited war" operations in the Middle East or elsewhere.

The most unusual problem encountered in the Lebanon operation was that of the need to negotiate for objectives in lieu of seizing them. On several occasions when we felt the occupation of key terrain features necessary for our own security, we found the Lebanese Army units already emplaced upon them. In the early phase of the operation the



Unique command structure: Second Provisional Marine Force under command of both Naval and Land Force Commanders



Lebanese tank

reliability of these friendly units could not be automatically assumed and, therefore, in order to avoid an incident, it was necessary to negotiate through Lebanese liaison officers for the replacement of these units by ours. In addition, it was usually necessary to obtain the land owner's permission prior to our forces being able to occupy a given piece of real estate. Occasionally, after our units deployed to a new objective, Lebanese units would take up positions on


the next hill to our front, usually between us and any rebel strongpoint. In essence, the US forces were well protected by the Lebanese.

On a few occasions our positions drew harassing fire from the opposition. These scattered incidents had a profound sobering effect on our troops and provided the incentive necessary in constructing good foxholes and bunkers. They soon realized that this was not just an exercise or a game to be treated lightly. The

training and experience gained by our Marines under very real field conditions was tremendous in both quantity and quality and will long be a substantial contribution in keeping the Corps in a high state of readiness.

Logistics

From the logistics aspect, Operation BLUEBAT was greatly hampered by the limited number of usable beaches in the Beirut area capable of handling the large amount of supplies and equipment required to support a landing of this size. As it was not our desire to inflict damage to private property, the beach north of Beirut considered most acceptable was not utilized as the exits were bound by orchards and cultivated areas. Red Beach, south of Beirut, selected for use by the first two battalions, offered very poor trafficability in the soft sand. Initially, in the absence of shore party equipment and beach matting, it was necessary to employ amphibian tractors to tow the equipment across the beach. Even with the arrival of the shore party equipment the beach was deemed inadequate and only selective unloading was accomplished. General unloading began over Yellow Beach on D+3, six hours after BLT I/8 commenced landing. This beach was trafficable but as it was



Bluebat landing beaches



Phalangist roadblock: effective in enforcing city-wide strike

only 200 yards long and 75 yards wide, unloading was limited to one TransPhibRon at a time. The airlifted battalion, 2/8, was used to augment the shore party group and assisted greatly in this mammoth task. As general unloading over the beach had not been necessary in any operation since the Korean War, snarls and delays at the outset were encountered as a result of inexperienced personnel. Soon, however, the chronic unloading, storage and supply problems were solved commendably by determination and hard work of all personnel concerned and the unloading of all TransPhibrons was completed in seven and one half days, working on a 24-hour a day basis. During this period, over 10,000 tons of supplies were landed over the beaches. Prior to the commencement of general unloading arrangements had been made with local port authorities to obtain open storage and warehousing facilities for supplies and equipment. This space soon proved to be inadequate, however, and additional space in the Beirut rail marshalling yards was utilized. Upon commitment of Marine units ashore, leasing open and closed storage space for supplies was a problem encountered in the unique political-military crisis existing at the time. Had our units actually been committed to combat no problem would have existed. This was the first time Marines had been confronted with such a situation and we were completely unfamiliar with procedures. This was definitely a

drawback to the effectiveness of our logistic support capability.

The scarcity of sufficient storage space caused our ammunition and fuel dumps to be over crowded and improperly dispersed, a liability rather than an asset as they were in congested areas vulnerable to attack and sabotage. The tremendous amount of ammunition stored in the marshalling yards alone, if ignited, would have caused tremendous damage. The unique habit of the local people firing their small arms into the air contributed to our apprehension as spent rounds were continually dropping in the storage areas. With the assistance of personnel of the US Embassy and later through the services of a naval officer experi-

enced in contracts and leases, the urgent need for dispersion was met by the procurement of additional storage areas.


A few hours prior to the commencement of general unloading, a Logistic Support Group was activated and personnel were drawn from the service support elements of the BLTs. The headquarters was staffed by personnel airlifted from the US who arrived in the objective area the day prior to the activation of the group. Although this was a provisional type organization, hastily activated and having no appreciable time for researching plans, manuals or background material for establishing an operational procedure, the group did prove that the concept for




Phalangist roadblock



Mechanical Mule moved easily through soft sand



Camouflaged Ontos ready to move on short notice



Crowded conditions for ammunition storage

a Logistic Support Group is valid and that a definite requirement does exist in the Marine Corps today for this type organization. Whenever two or more battalions are operating ashore, the Logistic Support Group is required for maximum efficiency in order to consolidate all service support elements under central control and to provide the necessary logistical back-up. The exception to this hypothesis would occur when battalions operate in widely separated areas, where time/distance factors would preclude effective centralized control and in such an instance, the BLT organization should remain in effect. However, the situation in Lebanon was quite adaptable to the Logistic Support Group innovation and the BLTs, being serviced from the force level, were more mobile and received a more equitable distribution of supplies and equipment.

Local availability of numerous logistical items was an asset to the force during the operation. Not only was it the most expedient method of supply but it deleted the expense incurred in shipment from the US and at the same time made more shipping available for other necessary resupply. Daily requirements for POL were filled locally allowing the POL already in drums to remain as a reserve until backloaded with the BLTs. Building material for galleys, heads and other camp improvements, as well as necessary house-keeping items, were also procured in the area.

Sanitation in the field assumed new importance in the initial period as the frequency of dysentery increased among the Marines at an alarming rate and threatened the ability of our units to perform their mission. Poor individual and camp sanitation practices, aided by the enormous fly population, contributed to the spread of the dysentery. Stringent sanitation practices were enforced and fly-proof heads and galleys were constructed which soon alleviated this difficult health problem. However, this situation indicated that more emphasis should be placed throughout the Marine Corps on the indoctrination of personnel in the subject of field sanitation and personal hygiene.

As our Marine units were deployed over large sectors around the out-

skirts of Beirut, motor transport was subjected to particularly hard use in meeting the logistical requirements. The hauling of water, rations, personnel and equipment over extremely poor roads and hilly terrain soon began to show its effect in the increasing number of deadlined vehicles. A force maintenance shop was established in the early phase of the operation and performed 3d and 4th echelon maintenance on vehicles of all types. The determined effort put forth by this maintenance section was responsible for the above average percentage of vehicles that remained operative through the period ashore.

As the date for the retraction of our forces was indefinite, plans had to be made for any eventuality. One extreme would call for building camps and movement of units to higher ground to provide protection from the torrential seasonal rains. The other alternative was opposite in that it encompassed immediate full or partial retraction. With these alternative plans in mind, coping with the daily logistic problems of the force became increasingly difficult.

In order to support Operation BLUEBAT logistically, the determined efforts of agencies in all echelons of command were required. Throughout our stay concepts and procedures of logistics underwent an excellent test and in most cases

proved to be adequate. As always, shortages did exist but in most cases the needs of the force were met, although a certain amount of belt tightening was required in some categories. From the amount of support given our units in the field, it is quite evident that the accomplishment of our mission can largely be attributed to the combined efforts of logistic support agencies both in the US and locally.

Summary

Operation BLUEBAT was perhaps unique in history in that a combined force such as ours landed on foreign soil to support the legal government at its request with no combat casualties and in an atmosphere of friendly assistance. The timely deployment of US forces to Lebanon assisted in maintaining the stability of the government menaced by the intense pressure of rebel bands, fifth columnists, and the visible military threats along the borders. At the time of our landing no one could be certain of just how much or the nature of the opposition we might encounter. We were prepared for the worst, but fully intended to use only the minimum force needed.


The question foremost in everyone's mind was: Would our action bring about another Korea, with outside forces streaming over the borders of Lebanon? If we moved fast and acted quickly we could prevent

or deter such an occurrence. This, I think we did. As a result of the presence of US forces in and near Lebanon the independence of the country was maintained and the cause of freedom was furthered.

All of the participating US forces, the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marines, benefited from the operation as it was a true test for many concepts which previously were unproven. Close cooperation was displayed between all services and echelons of command and was an important factor in the success of the operation. In a final analysis the operation proved to be beneficial to both the US and Lebanon.

As the situation in Lebanon at most times was extremely delicate and the attention of the world was focused upon us, the conduct and performance of each Marine assumed new and important significance in maintaining the Corps' reputation as the world's most elite military organization. Although the long period in the field was extremely tedious and caused many personal discomforts and hardships on our troops, their morale and physical condition appeared to improve rather than decline. Their exceptional personal conduct in the practice of restraint, attention to duty and professional manner and appearance was always highly commendable and made us all mighty proud to be Marines.

USMC



Top Secret

☛ TWO NAVY CHAPLAINS WERE strolling down Thieves Alley in Yokosuka while on R&R from the 1stMarDiv during the Korean War. In a matter of minutes two girls came alongside, obviously seeking clients for their professional services. The chaplains continued walking in silence, ignoring the speeches and gestures of the girls. The younger chaplain, plainly embarrassed, finally turned to the girls at his side and fingered the gold cross on his collar, hoping that this would end the scene. The young girl, however, looked quickly up from the insignia and said, "I no tell!"

Capt Paul H. Westenberger

Where There's a Will There's . . .

☛ EVERYTHING AT THE YOKOSUKA Naval Base was in readiness to welcome CMC. The Marine honor guard was formed. Sirens announced the arrival of the general's motorcade.

Suddenly the officer in command of the honor guard noticed a Japanese dump truck that had somehow slipped in and parked in front of the administration building. Looking around desperately for a driver, he singled out one of the spectators.

"Private!" he shouted: "Move that truck. On the double!"

Though unfamiliar with the operation of such a vehicle, the Marine sprang into action. He started the engine without difficulty, then briefly experimented with the gears to a loud accompaniment of clashing, grating noises. At last, peering expectantly ahead, he released the clutch. But the truck didn't move. The truck bed slowly tilted up, dumping a full load of gravel squarely in front of the main entrance to the administration building.

The Commandant was steered to a side entrance.

TSgt W. A. O'Neal, USMC (Ret)



THE MARINES HAVE LANDED



By LtCol Charles A. LeClaire

✪ IN 1825 TWO US NAVAL OFFICERS landed in the small, remote port of Foxardo on the eastern tip of Puerto Rico. Their purpose was to seek recovery of goods stolen from an American firm and believed to be at this pirate base. They were insulted and abused by local officials and subsequently returned to their ship, which then sailed. Some time later they came in company with the flag-

ship of Commodore Porter, to whom they reported the incident. The Commodore sailed forthwith to Foxardo and immediately landed a force of sailors and Marines who seized and spiked a battery which had been observed preparing to fire on the Porter force. Porter demanded apology and satisfaction, landed with 200 men, marched on the town and received there the redress he had demanded.



LtCol LeClaire, a recent graduate of Senior School, is now serving on the Marine Corps Board, MCS, Quantico. He holds degrees from Alma (Mich.) College (AB), the Univ of Michigan (MBA) and George Washington Univ (JD). Enlisting in the Marine Corps in 1941, he was commissioned the following year. Prior to his assignment to MCS he served in the Office of Legislative Assistant to CMC.

There was an item in LtCol John A. Crown's recent article which brought to mind incidents such as this honor expedition on Foxardo. In his study, *Why A Marine Corps*, in the November GAZETTE, he stated: "The Marines, alone of all our Armed Forces, can be landed for warlike purposes without their actions being accounted acts of war." At the risk of appearing contentious, but with no such intention or purpose, it should be observed that this statement is at least an over-simplification. The conclusion reached in the above quotation cannot be gainsaid but there are many points of consideration involved which make this question so complex that it cannot be dismissed in a single sentence.

Perhaps there was a time in our history when the nature of things were such that this question could be concluded so easily. A hundred years or so ago, when our area of interest was much more limited than the global responsibilities we have today, and when relationships in the international community of nations were materially different, this conclusion was easier to reach without doubt. Certainly the situation today is distinguishable from 1832 when a force of 250 seamen and Marines landed at Quallah Battoo, Sumatra, to take punitive action against natives accused of robbing an American ship and murdering certain crew members. Before the natives surrendered and begged forgiveness the force stormed and seized a fort and burned a considerable portion of the town. It is difficult to conceive that the US today would even consider such an action, or that it would be tolerated in the world society. It was then an accepted and rather commonplace type action.

Since the founding of the Corps, Marines have participated in many landings and expeditions on foreign

shore, so many that it is impossible, from a practical standpoint, to determine the exact number. It is not inaccurate to say, however, that such instances number over 200. Any listing would be only illustrative, if for no other reason than the difficulty of distinguishing between intermeshed actions. The rather commonplace nature of such Marine Corps activity in the past can be illustrated by looking to China, even limiting the time frame to this century. During the period 1911 to 1933 our forces were landed in China on over 30 occasions.

On the other hand, it must be recognized that the last 30 years has seen many changes which directly affect the use of Marines on shore in lands across the seas. The international and world-encompassing relationships of nations is the most important change. Another important

change, which might appear unrelated upon first consideration, is the tremendous development in speed of transport and communication. These technical strides have foreclosed much of the practical application of "on the spot" force taken at the initiative of the commander present. In the past, such forays could easily be disowned by the government as unauthorized actions of the officer who ordered the landing. For example, as a result of the Foxardo landing, Commodore Porter was court-martialed for overstepping the limit of his authority. He was sentenced to be suspended for 6 months, but resigned to become commander-in-chief of the Mexican navy at the handsome salary of \$25,000 per year. However, with the communications we have today, the government would be hard pressed to disavow such acts. Thus, present day expeditions must be based upon sound foundations of law and moral right. In addition, the nature of the world and its population has changed so that many of the instances recognized in international law 100 years ago would have no validity today. It is doubtful that the scope of international law would include sanctioning the Quallah Battoo expedition, or the then legitimate action by a detachment of seamen and Marines who burned the principal



Lebanon, 1958



Guantanamo Bay, 1898

town at Sualib Bay, Fiji Islands, in 1840 as retaliation for an attack on an American surveying party.

The use of Marines ashore in foreign nations can, for the purpose of logical discussion, be divided into three areas which require consideration: international law, constitutional law, and the use of Marine Corps forces.

International Law

The field of international law is, by its nature and source, considerably different from the body of law with which most of us are familiar. Our domestic law is based, to a considerable extent, upon the statutes which are enacted by the legislative bodies at our various levels of government. Then, upon these statutes, as well as from other sources, our rather regular and well-defined judicial system develops other aspects of those rules we know as law. In the international theater, however, there is no such system or procedure. International law is almost exclusively a product of development or evolution in practice. There is no legislative branch to develop international statutes and there is precious little in the way of an international tribunal system to judicially further the production of anything resembling a clear-cut body of law. Nonetheless, there has developed over the centuries of international intercourse a system which "governs relations between independent states," as put by the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague. The sources of international law are numerous, but include treaties,

precedents, customs and other principles developed from interrelations of mankind on this globe. It is from this source that the answer to the first question must be drawn.

There are many circumstances under which a nation may be authorized to take armed action in the territory of another without the matter being considered, in international law, an act of war. Among the reasons which have been recognized are the protection of one's citizens; the punishment of murder or injury to one's citizens in semi-civilized or backward countries; the suppression of riots and restoration of order; the collection of indemnities; the seizure of custom houses as security for payment of claims; to maintain stable government; to destroy pirates and other like purposes. A reading of this list points up the matter discussed above—the development of the world has rendered patently invalid some of these reasons. One can hardly imagine, in our time, a punitive expedition to kill inhabitants of another locality or to seize custom houses but this was rather commonplace 100 years ago and our country played a part, along with other world powers, in such actions. Because of the practical realities of today, this discussion will be limited to the consideration of armed action where the reason involves the instability of the local government and the inability or refusal of that government to protect US citizens, property, and rights. It should be also recognized that the international law interpretation is not necessary where there

is a treaty provision in effect which authorizes such action, or where the US is requested by the government involved to take action by landing armed forces.

As a general proposition, the authorities writing on international law recognize the right of a country to intervene for purposes set forth above. It was well stated by one authority in this field when he wrote:

"When order is neglected by, or is impossible for the foreign government, then the more advanced state has a right to intervene for the protection of the life and property of its citizens. . . . If the cause of complaint results from prolonged inability to render the proper protection, which means that it is chronic, then the intervention generally assumes the form of armed interference."

In the broad coverage of international rules the authorities are in general agreement that a nation has a right, indeed a duty, to provide such protection for its interests and citizens abroad.

In this connection, it would be less than realistic not to recognize the relationship between this armed interposition and belligerency or a state of war. Under the above stated premise the US would have only one purpose in interposing in another nation, the non-political purpose of protection for its citizens and interests. However, the only reason such a landing of armed forces may not ordinarily result in war is because the state wherein the armed forces were placed lacks the desire or the

power to resist, or to resist to a degree sufficient to create war. This fine line, obviously based upon the facts of the situation rather than upon any rule of international law, has long been recognized. President Jefferson, with relation to the difficulty with Spain in 1805, said:

"Considering that Congress alone is constitutionally invested with the power of changing our condition from peace to war, I have thought it my duty to await their authority for using force in any degree which could be avoided."

Mr. Jefferson recognized that his use of armed force could remove from this country (and Congress) the power to declare or refrain from war. The decision on whether or not there would be war would be exclusively Spain's. However, he went on to say that he had ordered naval units on the spot to take the necessary action to protect the interests of our citizens.

Even though it is very possible for war to result, it can be concluded with certainty that international law recognizes and sanctions the right of a country to interpose with armed forces for several reasons without such action being considered an act of war.

Not included within the conclusion stated in *Why a Marine Corps*, but of vital consideration in any examination of this question, is the broad, far-reaching question regarding the constitutional authority of the President to use military forces, and specifically Marine Corps forces,

in actions on foreign shores without a formal declaration of war by the Congress.

Constitutional Law

The Constitution of the United States sets forth the respective responsibilities of the President and the Congress with regard to military forces. Article II, Section 2, makes the President the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces wherein it provides:

"The President shall be the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into actual service of the United States,"

The Constitution places certain responsibilities upon the Congress. In this connection, Article I, Section 8, in parts pertinent to this discussion, provides that Congress shall have exclusive power to:

"... provide for the common defense. . .

"To declare war . . .

"To raise and support Armies, but no appropriation to the use shall be for a longer term than two years;

"To provide and maintain a Navy.

"To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;"

The courts have continually and consistently ruled that the war powers of the Congress and the President are broad and can be interpreted to cover practically every facet of the citizen's life, limited of course by the judicial determination of what the necessity will tolerate. This

is true in the time of peace, as well as in time of war. Even though a state of war does not, in fact, exist, there is no longer any question but what these "war powers" can be invoked for the protection of the nation, *in futuro*. In spite, however, of this vast reservoir of power, judicial rulings have made it clear that the Constitution must be strictly and consistently obeyed in this area of authority and this is particularly true with respect to the powers and duties which are respectively of the three separate branches of the government. Though each power resting in the separate branches of government has many ancillary or subordinate powers, neither Congress nor the President can intrude upon the constitutionally exclusive power of the other.

As was concluded above, the act of interposition with military forces for legitimate purposes is not considered an act of war. However, history has many apt examples demonstrating the fine line of demarcation between such armed interposition and acts of war. The difference could be said, in many cases, to depend exclusively upon the surrounding circumstances of the particular moment, and is not based upon any recognizable rule or generalization. As President Jefferson pointed out in the incident with Spain in 1805, this dividing line was most difficult to establish. There are many such incidents, therefore, where the Executive has been hesitant to act. Another example can be found during the incumbency of President Buchanan. During a troubled period in China the Secretary of State, Mr. Cass, reflected executive hesitancy, or recognition of this fine-line of distinction:


"... military expeditions into the Chinese territory can not be undertaken without the authority of the National Legislature."

However, many executives have not had the same hesitancy as Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Cass. Almost without exception the use of Marines in such landing forces has been upon the authority of the President.

That Congress is aware of its responsibilities in this area is apparent. In 1858, during congressional debate on a resolution authorizing the president "to adopt such measures and use such force as in his judgment



Korea, 1871



Bahamas, 1776

may be necessary and advisable" in adjusting differences with Paraguay, considerable controversy developed under the words "and to use such force." The disagreement could, with a minimal substitution of words, pass for excerpts from the extended discussions of the engagement of US forces in Korea; the dispatch of military units to Europe under NATO auspices; the Quemoy, Matsu, offshore island situation each time it comes up; or Lebanon.

It is at least as difficult to distinguish the Constitutional line drawn between interposition and war as it is to make the distinction externally under international law. Notwithstanding, it has long been accepted that the President has the power to use armed US units for interposition in foreign countries. The Attorney General of the US, in 1941, addressed himself directly to this question and concluded:

"Indeed, the President's authority has long been recognized as extending to the dispatch of armed forces outside of the United States, either on missions of good will or rescue, or for the purpose of protecting American lives or property, or American interests."

In any action short of war, there does not appear to be any doubt that the President has the authority under our Constitution to use armed forces for foreign interposition. However,

as mentioned above, this rule is often obscured in practice because the effect may not be known, and usually is not, until *after* the act of interposition—it depends upon the reaction.

The Use of Marine Corps Forces

The third area of interest is in the use of the US Marine Corps in such acts of interposition on foreign shores. The history of the US recites many instances of such use of armed forces abroad. An examination of such instances where troops were landed indicates that the troops involved were almost exclusively Marines or, in the smaller "on the spot" actions, joint Navy and Marine forces. Examples are the repeated use of Marine forces in China, Nicaragua and Haiti. History shows that the US has been the most consistent user of such forces in our past international relationships and the Marine Corps has been the customary vehicle.

Unquestionably, one of the reasons why practically all such landings have involved Marine Corps personnel is that they were available when and where such action was required. However, there are other reasons why Marines traditionally have been used for such actions. In fact, in the larger, more protracted and sustained operations, there were other overriding considerations which dictated the use of Marines.

First, with respect to relationships with other countries, the landing of Marines is much less likely to be considered an act of war or to result in a state of war by way of reaction or resistance. Through the years the use of Marines, by this country and others, for interposition in foreign countries has resulted in a recognition in the international community that their employment is for purposes short of war. Thus, Marines can be used in such actions while at the same time minimizing the possibility of the landing resulting in denomination as an act of war. Consideration of this condition shows that a part of this unique attribute of Marine forces is related to the ability to move Marine units with speed and certainty, and to the fact that such Marine forces are available where and when needed. A landing, made at the time the need arises, is considerably less likely to generate fears of war than a troop movement made after detailed deliberation by the President and, perhaps, legislative action by the Congress. William Howard Taft in his book, *Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers*, recognized this fact:

"... In practice, the use of naval marines for such a purpose has become so common that their landing is treated as a mere local police measure whereas if troops of the Regular Army are used for such purpose, it seems to take on the color of an act of war."

Such a landing of Marine forces also enhances the security of this nation because it is made at the time it is needed and thus at a time when the local situation is such that there is less likelihood and capability of effective reaction which could result in a state of war. The use of Marine forces is of advantage to this country in the international relationship aspect and is less likely to result, domestically, in executive abrogation of the legislative power of war declaration. This national benefit attendant to the use of Marines was recognized by Congressman Kilday in a debate on the floor of the House of Representatives, 16 May 1952. He stated it this way:

"I wonder if the gentleman agrees with me that the United States Marine Corps holds a special position in the military forces of the World. That the Marine Corps can land in

Nicaragua, Puerto Rico, Haiti, or anywhere else. It is not regarded as occupation of the country by a military force."

The laws of this nation relating to the use of armed forces constitute the second reason why it has been the almost invariable practice to use Marines for this purpose. The right of the President of the US to use Marines for such landings and expeditions has been the law since 1798:

"... The Marine Corps shall be liable to duty in the forts and garrisons of the United States, on the sea coast, or any other duty on shore, as the President, at his discretion may direct."

President Theodore Roosevelt in 1908 reflected the statutory authority dealing with the duties of the Corps in an executive order which provided in part:

"... To furnish such garrisons and expeditionary forces for duties beyond the seas as may be necessary in time of peace."

The law in effect today provides the legislative framework for the duties and responsibilities of the several branches of our armed forces. This statute specifically carries on this traditional and customary area of Marine Corps operation wherein it provides:

"... and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct..."

Under our Constitution the President commands the military and naval forces provided by the Congress. The Marine Corps, created by the Congress, is delivered to the President with Congressional authority to use as he deems necessary. He has no such statutory authority with respect to any other of the military services. This is a unique attribute of Marine forces under our law. The Marines can be used as can no other service forces.

Our international relationships over the years have had a heavy sprinkling of incidents where US Marines have been employed abroad for the protection of national interests. These have ranged from landings where the Marines were ashore for only a few hours or days, to protracted situations such as China, Cuba, Nicaragua, and the like. This use of Marines has become both accepted and expected at home and by other countries.

The US has a right and a duty to protect its lawful and legitimate interests whenever and wherever necessary. The President has the authority to employ the armed forces under his command for this purpose and the Congress has specifically provided the Marine Corps for such use. The ordering of Marine Corps units into foreign countries for this purpose is in accord with international law, custom and precedent, based upon many years of practice consisting of a large number of incidents wherein Marines were so employed. Such action, furthermore, is in strict accord with the law of this nation on the subject.

One cannot leave this subject without comment on an additional attribute attendant to the use of Marine forces on such missions. The danger spots which confront the US today are located on the rimland of the seas. The high degree of strategic mobility inherent in this nation's Navy-Marine Corps forces makes readily accessible to such forces these potential sources of trouble. Furthermore, the normal world-wide deployment of Marine forces greatly

increases this availability and reduces the mechanics of their employment to little more than an order for execution in the event of need. This global deployment and concomitant strategic mobility, unique to the forces of the Navy-Marine Corps and unduplicated by any other military force in the world today, serves to prevent incidents and potential wars. By reason of the availability and readiness of these forces there exists a real and mighty deterrence to any potential trouble-maker; a deterrent even without the necessity of actually landing on foreign shore, serving to prevent incidents as well as constituting balanced forces in literal instant readiness to quell any trouble which might erupt. This attribute is of great value to the security of the US and the free world—to stop or prevent the trouble before it can involve the world in a destructive holocaust—a mission peculiarly suited to the Marine Corps by reason of recognition in international law, the Constitution of the US, the law enacted by the Congress, and expertness reached by long experience and practice.

USMC

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
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HEAVYWEIGHT PA

A MATCHED PAIR OF VEHICLES, one a prototype amphibian and the other armored, received their initial maneuver testing during the 1st Mar Div's TWIN PEAKS operation held 18-31 May at Camp Pendleton. The Experimental Landing Vehicle Tracked (LVTUX-2) and the Heavy Tank (M103-A1), designed to operate together, added additional power to the amphibious landing.

Known as "The Beast" by the men who operate and maintain it, the landing vehicle is a 63-ton heavy-weight capable of transporting a

company of infantry from ship to shore. It has a water speed of 7 mph and an overland speed of approximately 13 mph.

During operations, the LVTUX-2 can transport the heavy gun tank from an LSD through any sea or surf condition to a dry landing beyond the high water mark.

The M103-A1 is a 62½-ton self-propelled weapon with the longest cruising range of any US tank; greater maneuverability; and can out-gun any tank in use by anyone—anywhere.

More than 3 months ago the 1st Tank Bn was selected to field test several of these tanks. After exhaustive tests under actual field conditions, the battalion has come up with some amazing performance statistics: it can ford streams 4 feet deep; easily overcome 3-foot obstacles; climb 60 per cent grades; and can move over average terrain at a speed of 21 mph.

Mounting a 120mm gun and .50 and .30cal machine guns, the M103 carries a crew of 5 as compared with the 4-man crew of the lighter tanks.



Marine stands alongside LVTUX-2



M103-A1 moves toward

PAIR

the armor affords protection against small arms, shrapnel and light artillery. The armor plate is the heaviest ever employed on a vehicle of this type. Its 120mm cannon can fire a 50-pound projectile more than 18 miles.

The fighting elements of an M103 tank company can be embarked in LVTUX-2s aboard an LSD. In a logistic role, after taking the tanks ashore, one LVTUX-2 can move one complete day's rations for an entire Landing Force from ship to shore in one trip.

US MC




Heavy tank moves ashore



LVTUX-2 headed seaward



es toward opposition



Large screws propel amphibian afloat

Military Maps Simplified



By C. H. Strandberg

• DURING THE THICK OF THE FIGHTING in Korea, it became necessary one night to move a company of a reserve battalion from its position in the rear of a Regimental Zone of Action to a position on the flank of one of the forward battalions. The Chinese were attacking, and that whole portion of the area assigned to the 1st MarDiv was endangered by the threatened penetration. The night was moonless, the terrain rugged, and the company on unfamiliar ground. At the first indication that the movement of a reserve company might be necessary, the Regimental Operations Officer called the S-3 of the reserve battalion and one of the Company Commanders to the Observation Post to brief them and to plan with them the disposition of the company that was to be committed. The Company Commander left his unit under the command of his Executive Officer, a young 1st Lt who had just recently arrived in Korea.

When the warning order for the move arrived from battalion, the Executive Officer unshackled the coordinates and plotted on his map the location of the position to which he had been ordered to move the company. About this time, it began to rain, further blotting out the locations of the few identifiable landmarks. The lieutenant continued his preparations for moving the company noting, as he laid out the route and measured the compass headings of each leg, that the terrain contained many features that might

be very similar in appearance, particularly at night illuminated only by occasional flashes of artillery fire.

About 0100, the route having been laid out and the Platoon Commanders briefed on the route, destination, and the planned deployment on arrival, the order to move out arrived from battalion. The lieutenant led the company in route march formation toward the mouth of a narrow valley some two miles away. The orders from battalion were to occupy and defend the high ground on both sides of the valley. About an hour later, after painstakingly following the compass route that he had laid out, the lieutenant arrived at the mouth of the valley. He proceeded to the high ground on either flank where he was to meet the Company Commander, and began to move his platoons into positions protecting the right flank of the forward battalion. About 15 minutes later, as the rifle platoons were still moving into position, the company was taken under small arms fire from relatively close range from the left rear.

Several Marines were killed before the company was able to repulse the attack and complete the organization of the ground. During the remainder of the night Chinese troops were heard, apparently moving through the draw to the left of the company where, according to the map, there should not have been a draw.

With the coming of the dawn the mistake was discovered. The company had come up a valley about 400

yards to the right of the one it should have, leaving a serious gap in the lines. The other two companies of the reserve battalion were eventually required to drive out the Chinese who had penetrated the gap during the night.

Among those killed during the night's operation was the Company Executive Officer, the young lieutenant who had led the company into the wrong position.

Where had he made his error? The map found on his body told the story. He had not calculated the grid-magnetic declination when he plotted the compass course.

This story was related to me in 1954 after my return from Korea and eventual assignment to Quantico as an instructor in the Intelligence Section of the Basic School. The officer who told it to me was one of the surviving Platoon Commanders.

The telling of the story reminded me of a long discussion in which I became involved in 1952, while assigned as a student at the US Naval Photographic Interpretation Center, studying the art and science of making maps. The discussion resulted in a solution to a problem that many believe to be one of the most serious stumbling blocks in the road to successful use of maps in the field. The problem: the necessity for the calculation of an angle other than measured on the map for use as a compass azimuth when it is necessary to travel from one point to another cross-country, using the compass as the only means of maintaining direction. The solution: eliminate the necessity for calculating a different angle by departing from the classic system of rectangular coordinates based on the Grid North of the map projection that is normally overprinted on the map and substitute a system of rectangular coordinates based on Magnetic North. For field use there is only one practical North—the one that the user finds with his compass.

If the grid system on the map was oriented toward Magnetic North, the magnetic compass and the map could serve together directly as a team. All angles measured on the map from the overprinted grid would correspond exactly with like angles and bearings located with the compass. No intermediate arithmetic would be necessary between the laying out of the route to be traveled and the

final determination of the actual compass headings to be followed to arrive at the desired objective. Just lay out the route on the map, measure the angles with a protractor, and the compass headings would be known without the possibility of error like the one related earlier which cost the lives of the Marines.

Is such a solution feasible? Definitely! We have arrived half-way to this suggested ultimate goal already. Our 1/25,000, and perhaps our 1/50,000, tactical maps incorporate provisions for the user to draw a magnetic reference line on them. One merely draws a straight line from a point marked P at the bottom of one of the grid lines to a point located along a segment of a bar protractor located at the top of the map sheet. The correct location of the point along the bar protractor is calculated in the classic manner for the calculation of the GM (grid-magnetic) angle determined from the declination diagram at the bottom of the map. Full instructions for accomplishing this are contained in MCS 2-2, Map and Aerial Photograph Reading.

But what about the annual magnetic change, you might ask. Isn't this change such that, after a few years, the overprinted grid will be so far out of line that the maps will be worthless? Only remotely possible. The annual magnetic change is so small, except in very rare instances, that even after several years of cumulative change, a person following an azimuth read directly from a grid system based on Magnetic North would still be within "rock-throwing" distance of the intended objective when he had traveled the proper distance. And even so, this objection, if considered valid, could be easily overcome by the simple expedient of a notation at the bottom of the map, or at some other place, in the marginal information "Add (Subtract) (a certain amount of angular change) for each year since (the year the map was printed)." However, in view of the fact that the amount of annual magnetic change is usually measured in seconds of arc, and the fact that the field soldier's normal direction finding instrument, the lensatic compass, is a relatively crude instrument, the amount of annual magnetic change can rarely be incorporated into a refined reading for field use.



Mr. Strandberg, a former Marine officer, was one of 15 regular NCOs selected for commissions in 1947. He subsequently served with the 2d and 3d Divisions, and with the 1stMarDiv in Korea from Apr '53 until Feb '54, mostly as a photo interpreter. Since leaving the Marine Corps at Quantico in July 1956, he has worked in the field of photogrammetry. He is currently a research analyst with Broadview Research Corp in Washington, D. C.

But what about the times when the Grid North based on the type of map projection must be used? Wait a minute! Whose job are we trying to make easier? The "Mud-Marines" up forward, or the jobs of those guys in the rear with the gear? My position is to help the men who need it most, the tired ones who shoot the rifles. For the convenience of the others, tic marks can be left along the margins of the map sheet denoting the location of the projection grid system grid lines, just as they are for the locations of the geographic coordinate lines at the present time. Those who must use Grid North are far better equipped and are far less pressed for time to make calculations back from Magnetic to Grid North, than are the men at company level and below who must use the map under the most primitive of conditions.

The suggested system would have many additional benefits, in addition to the simplification of the use of maps for cross-country travel. The time saved in reporting enemy sightings and the plotting of these sightings on maps for the delivery of artillery fire could offer very material advantages to military commanders. Much of the agony in either plotting a two-point resection or in finding ones' own location in the field by the two-point intersection method would be automatically eliminated. As one of my gunnery sergeants asked me one time—"I took my two compass readings, Captain. Now just where the hell are we?"

The suggested solution would not, and could not, work on small-scale maps. On small-scale maps, lines connecting points of equal magnetic variation (isogonic lines) take on a definite curvature, making any system of rectangular coordinates impossible. But for large scale tactical maps, those that the fighting man on

the ground must use to plan and conduct military operations at the shanks-mare and shooting level, a grid system based on Magnetic North would marvelously simplify many serious problems.

"But what about the problem of joining several map sheets together? Seems like every time I'm in the field, I'm right at the intersection of four map sheets," some skeptical inquisitor asks. And the appropriate answer to that one is that distances are so great, in relation to the maximum effective range of the 4.2" mortar, across the surface of this irregular oblate spheroid called Earth, that isogonic curvature should present no problem at all over a few thousand meters.

How extensive a job would it be to change to the suggested system? Other than the change in concept, simplifying map use through elimination of calculations that are patently unnecessary, and which I'm sure a majority of map users would welcome, the change is purely a "printing plant" operation. The plates for printing the grid would have to be remade, reorienting the grid from Grid North to Magnetic North. The other four plates, those for printing vegetation, planimetry, water, and contour lines, would remain unchanged.

How much cost is involved in this changeover? A few thousand dollars at most. All other printing costs remain the same. Peanuts, when compared with the intangible advantages gained in simplifying the use of maps in the field.

One of the great military leaders of the past made the statement "We shall defeat the enemy not by the complexity of our tactics, but by their very simplicity." Why not begin right now, by simplifying one of the foot soldier's most basic tools, his map?

USMC

ST GEORGE FOR



✚ ONCE THE BRITISH GENERAL Munro arrived at Gallipoli "to put a stop to this damned side show," the fate of that campaign was sealed. With the final evacuation in January, 1916, British amphibious warfare hibernated for two and one-half years.

Although the Kaiser's highly vaunted surface fleet did not overly concern the Allies, his underwater fleet gradually grew to the proportions of an ogre whose insatiable appetite for merchant shipping threatened to force England from the war. In the spring of 1917 the First Sea Lord actually told the War Cabinet that unless shipping losses were curtailed England could not continue the war through 1918!

A large portion of losses was occurring in the English Channel. German U-boats used 2 approach routes to it: from Baltic bases including the Heligoland Bight north around Scotland, and from the Bight and Flanders through the Dover Straits. The Straits saved a large U-boat from the Bight 6 out of

DR ENGLAND

By Robert B. Asprey

The blocking of Zeebrugge on St. George's Day . . . may well rank as the finest feat of arms in the Great War, and certainly as an episode unsurpassed in the history of the Royal Navy . . . W. S. Churchill

Photographs courtesy Imperial War Museum, London, England

25 operable days. It saved a small submarine from Flanders 8 out of 14 operable days. To confine the enemy to the longer northern route would decrease appreciably his operational period in the Channel. So important was the Straits passage that the First Sea Lord ordered "all other considerations must give way to combating this submarine menace, and to denying the Straits to the enemy submarines."

Foremost of these considerations was the prevailing naval hierarchy, an ultra-conservative body devoted to avoiding action. In August, 1917, a thorough shake-up changed the picture. Among others Roger Keyes—the *enfant terrible* of the Fleet—was appointed Director of Naval Plans, one of the most important jobs in Admiralty.

Keyes took one look at the Dover Straits defense and, with characteristic candor, denounced it as worthless. Adm Bacon, who held the Dover Command, not unnaturally resented the criticism. But Bacon lost the ensuing battle and Keyes was

given the Dover Command. He at once augmented the existing mine and net barrage with numerous and continuous patrol craft, flares at night, and deep minefields, his theory being that the lights and patrols would force U-boats to dive to destruction against the mines.

His attention next focused on the German naval base at Bruges, an inland Belgian port connecting by

canals to the coast ports of Zeebrugge and Ostend. In addition to harboring 38 submarines, Bruges supported 28 destroyers and 35 torpedo boats. The surface craft had been sent "to attack the guard boats at the entrance to the Channel, so as to make it easier for our U-boats to get through." In one night the previous year these raiders had sunk 11 guardships, 2 destroyers, a merchant ship,



Sunken blockships in entrance to Bruges Canal at Zeebrugge.

and damaged numerous other guardships. Keyes' new scheme of defense embodied many more patrol craft. Obviously an enemy force capable of instantaneous raids could not but prove an anathema to such patrol operations. One way to halt the raids was to close the base upon which the craft relied.

British monitor ships and airplanes had already bombarded the submarine pens at Bruges with about as much effect as the WWII bombings of the St. Nazaire pens. The German Adm Scheer later wrote: "They had built special craft for this purpose, monitors with shallow draught and armed with a gun of heavy calibre, but these had not once succeeded in inflicting serious damage though they had made many attempts." An alternate action existed, however: a blocking operation of Zeebrugge and Ostend whose canal entrances were only about 300 feet wide. This plan had been suggested as early as 1916. At first acquaintance Keyes was not impressed, mainly because of the numerous batteries and fortifications commanding the approaches to the ports. Of the 56 anti-aircraft batteries along the Flan-

ders coast, 10 were in the Ostend area and 9 in the Zeebrugge area.

But as Keyes came to realize the value of Bruges to the enemy, the blocking scheme more and more struck his fancy, particularly since he believed that the heavy guns could be neutralized by smoke screens, a device used by the Germans so effectively at the Battle of Jutland.

After gaining a staff estimate and outline plan based on intelligence from aerial photographs and refugees, Keyes proposed the operation for March, 1918. Following an outline of his plan and purpose he wrote: "At first sight, the blocking operation may be regarded, particularly at Zeebrugge, as a hazardous enterprise; but I feel very strongly that we shall not be asking the personnel engaged to take any greater risks than the infantry and tank personnel are subjected to on every occasion on which an attack is delivered on shore."

The operation certainly was hazardous enough. The right flank of the German army loomed only eight and one-half miles west of Ostend. From here, east to the Dutch frontier, 225 guns defended, over half being

from 6" to 15", the latter boasting a 42,000 yard range. Coastal defense was in the hands of German Marines.


The Ostend phase, a purely blocking operation, was bad enough. Two cumbersome blockships—obsolete unarmored cruisers—would be subject to direct fire from 2 or 3 shore batteries. Because a diversionary attack in this area was impossible, the defensive fire would be continuous.

But Zeebrugge was a nightmare. Keyes proposed to sink 3 blockships in the canal entrance. A large amount of silt had reduced harbor depth to a degree that even small submarines could not pass through at low tide. One ship would sink in the lock gates and the 2 remaining in the canal entrance where silt already formed a partial barrier.

Only one-half mile west of the canal Zeebrugge Mole curves almost one and one-half miles into the ocean. Connected to the mainland by a 300 yard road and railway viaduct, the outer Mole is an 80 yard wide stone structure. On its seaward side a pathway runs 16 feet above the base, 360 yards beyond the Mole proper, to a lighthouse at the tip. A seaward parapet three and one-half feet high borders this pathway. Buildings on the Mole included a railway station, 2 large warehouses, 4 hangars for the seaplane anchorage, troop quarters, overhanging submarine shelters and heavy naval batteries, including one 4.1" and two 3.5" guns on the Mole extension. The entire Mole was covered with a network of fixed defenses.

The 3.5" battery commanded the harbor entrance. For the blockships to reach their targets, they would have to pass within 100 yards of this battery. Consequently it had to be destroyed, which meant a troop assault of the Mole. But the railway and road viaduct would allow enemy reinforcement from shore—thus this too had to be eliminated.

For his assault, Keyes formed the 4th Battalion of Royal Marine Light Infantry which went into special training in late February, 1918, as well as a battalion of sailors. Royal Marine artillerymen would man the heavy armament of the assault ship. Like all personnel participating in this operation, the assault troops were volunteers.



The assault, covered by smoke, would hit the seaward side of the Mole close to the end. An old armoured cruiser, the *Vindictive*, was specially prepared. To even reach the high parapet of the Mole, a false deck was needed. Built on the port side, with ramps leading up to it from the starboard main deck, it held 18 gangways which could be dropped on the parapet to counter the 4 to 7 foot additional estimated height of the parapet above the false deck. One 11" and two 7.5" howitzers were mounted on the upper portions of the ship along with four 6" guns, six pom-poms, 16 Lewis guns and 16 Stokes mortars. Two fixed flame-throwers, one fore and one aft, were to defend against close enemy assault. Since the *Vindictive* could carry only the first assault wave she would tow 2 old ferry boats, the *Iris* and the *Daffodil*, as troop carriers. Egress from these would be by scaling ladders. Each of the ships carried derricks to lower large grappling irons over the parapet for anchorage.

The naval battalion was to assault the extension battery. The Marines were to assault a defensive position about 150 yards from the Mole's end. After taking this, the Marines would continue down the Mole to establish a perimeter defense against the shore while demolition teams worked over the installations. To isolate the Mole, 2 submarines heavily loaded with explosives and manned by skeleton crews were to be exploded under the viaduct.

Delay in fitting out the blockships and in obtaining sufficient chemical for the large smoke requirement caused a one month postponement. For deception purposes it was leaked that the special Marine-Naval infantry force was intended to demolish Calais and Dunkirk should the enemy break through (certainly a possibility in view of his March offensive). Frequent monitor and air bombardments against the Belgian coast continued during the planning period as did frequent patrols by fast motor boats.

Embarkation of troops commenced on 6 April 1918. The total force consisted of 165 vessels, 82 officers and 1698 enlisted. At 1930 on 12 April the convoy sailed. At 2330 aerial bombardment commenced over the target and at 0110 heavy

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
monitor bombardment began. The wind, at first favorable to vital smoke-laying plans, died and then shifted to the southeast. With great reluctance Keyes ordered a return to England: "... 120 odd vessels could not go within close range of the enemy's formidable batteries and escape annihilation during the approach, without an efficient smoke screen which was impossible after the wind shifted." Three nights later the operation recommenced but a heavy wind caused early cancellation.

The next possible period of operations lay 3 weeks away. The Admiralty, on grounds that security could not be maintained with such a large force immobilized, decided to cancel the attack. Keyes, however, successfully argued that despite a full moon he could proceed in 9 or 10 days. On 22 April a northerly wind gave him his chance. The force again sailed. Just prior to

darkness Keyes signalled all ships apropos of 23 April, "Saint George for England."

By 2230 a light wind blew steadily from the northeast and a misty rain reduced visibility to less than a mile. While obliterating the moon, the rain also cancelled aerial bombardment. Monitor bombardment was delayed for 15 minutes.

At 2310 the first CMBs, fast motor boats, raced to lay smoke across the landing front. At 2320 another CMB set a smoke float off Blankenberghe, an enemy torpedo-boat base—this was renewed every 20 minutes. Simultaneously other CMBs began dropping smoke floats in the western and eastern sides of the target while 2 more CMBs cut to the inner side of the Mole to torpedo moored enemy ships and then to lay smoke against the heavy shore batteries. At 2340, just 20 minutes before the *Vindictive's* landing, 2 CMBs laid smoke-



Concrete shelter for submarines at Bruges

floats on the seaward side of the Mole extension battery.

At 2350 the favorable wind dropped and, after releasing star shells, the enemy opened fire. Six minutes later the *Vindictive* lumbered through smoke to emerge about 300 yards from the Mole extension. Most of the smoke floats here had been sunk by enemy fire; now adverse wind dissipated the rest. The *Vindictive* lay nakedly exposed to the extension battery which raked her port for a few ghastly moments. Replying with her top guns she continued forward to bump the Mole wall at 0001. The immense confusion, however, caused the Captain to land 340 yards beyond the desired site. This was at once disastrous: it exposed his ship to direct fire from western shore batteries and it placed the troops in an almost impossible tactical position. The extension battery now lay to the rear across flat ground defended by entrenched small arms including machine guns.

The special anchors proved useless because the derricks holding them were too short to reach over the parapet. All but two of the special gangways had been smashed by the first enemy salvos which also caused over 50 per cent troop casualties including the Naval assault commander, the Marine assault commander and his executive officer, all killed, and the Naval assault executive officer, severely wounded.

Arriving at the Mole 3 minutes later, the *Daffodil* nosed the *Vindictive* against the seawall. Despite heavy fire she continued this function during the entire assault.

The first force ashore stormed east along the pathway for 40 yards without opposition. At a concrete control station of an 8" shore battery, its commander sent some of the force down a ladder to engage the enemy who were running from nearby shelters to the shoreward side of the Mole. He then attacked east along

the pathway toward his primary objective, the extension battery. Machine gun fire from his right forced him back to the concrete shelter. Receiving a few reinforcements he again attacked. At this point his executive officer, despite a broken jaw, joined him. The latter led the next attack—only one or two returned to the *Vindictive* when the recall siren sounded.

The zone which defeated the Naval assault was the primary objective of the Marine battalion. But because the *Vindictive* had landed too far down the Mole and because of a lack of troops, the most important mission became defense against the shore enemy. The Marines established a position about 200 yards ahead of the *Vindictive* at the shoreward end of a supply shed. By the time an assault against the northern defense had been organized, the siren sounded recall. Failure to establish a secure position on the Mole in itself negated demolition work and none was accomplished although the demolition units aided tremendously in establishing a rear-guard for the evacuation. Finally the Marines withdrew in groups of 6, "carrying their wounded with them over the scaling ladders."

Meanwhile artillerymen aboard the *Vindictive* carried on a fierce battle. Very accurate enemy fire knocked out a succession of gun crews. By the time the siren sounded the entire top armament of the *Vindictive* was destroyed.

The *Daffodil*, engaged in pinning the *Vindictive* against the Mole, managed to disgorge a few of her troops over her bow but more than a company of sailors and 2 Marine demolition crews were not landed. The *Iris*, her tow having parted prematurely, arrived 10 minutes behind schedule. Unable to tie up along the Mole she was forced to come alongside the *Vindictive's* starboard, but by this time the siren had

sounded. Thus a company of Marines, a company of sailors, and 3 Marine Vickers gun and mortar sections were not landed.

Only one of the submarines accomplished its mission. Refusing to use the automatic gyro-steering, the Captain steered his craft into the viaduct at over 9 knots speed. She penetrated between 2 rows of piers until her conning tower struck against a horizontal girder. After lighting the fuses, the small crew just escaped in a wrecked skiff. Two hundred yards away from the viaduct they were rocked by an enormous blast which hurled 100 feet of viaduct and enemy into the night. Minutes later a picket boat got to them. The other submarine arrived in time to see the first explode whereupon its Captain retired from the action.

Because of excellent smoke cover and surprise the blockships fared far better than the circumstances warranted, especially since the *Vindictive* assault failed to knock out the Mole extension battery. First in, the *Thetis* tore through an outer harbor net defense only to be hit by repeated salvos from the extension battery. Limping on toward the canal entrance, her battered engines finally stopped. She ran aground about 300 yards from the eastern pier. At once signalling the following blockships to pass starboard, she managed to start one engine, swing to starboard in the dredged channel, and sink. Her crew escaped with 20 per cent casualties.

The *Intrepid* took very little fire and no damage, probably because the *Thetis* absorbed the attention and most of the ready ammunition of the extension battery. Passing the *Thetis*, the *Intrepid* entered the narrow part of the canal entrance, swung across the channel and sank, her crew escaping with one death.

Following hard on, the *Iphigenia* suffered some damage from enemy



fire. Her Captain observed the *Intrepid* "aground on the western bank, with a gap between her bows and the eastern bank." Having practically assured his mission to ground on the western bank, he now risked success by maneuvering to fill the eastern gap. With great difficulty and under constant fire he brought his bow into the gap and his stern into the opposite bank. He then sank his ship. Escape was not without heavy casualties.

Once the blockships had passed the Mole and the viaduct had been blown, no reason remained for continuing the Mole assault. At 0050, recall sounded and 20 minutes later the *Vindictive*, generating her own smoke, pulled away from the Mole. She retired without further casualties as did the *Daffodil*. The *Iris*, however, could not make smoke. Caught by the extension battery she was mercilessly smashed. Her troops, not having landed on the Mole, now took the worst casualties of the assault: 77 killed and 105 wounded. Nor was the extension battery finished: during the withdrawal a destroyer, confused by the smoke, emerged suddenly in Zeebrugge harbor. She was fired on and was sunk, but most of her crew was saved.

The attack on Ostend occurred simultaneously. Monitor bombardment from the sea and from siege guns at Dunkirk engaged coastal batteries in this area. Small craft supported by destroyers—a total of 67 vessels—laid a heavy smoke screen off Ostend harbor. Just prior to the blockships' scheduled arrival calcium light buoys were dropped to mark the piers.

The two blockships used a whistle buoy well east of Ostend as departure point for the target. Unknown to the English, their enemy had recently moved this buoy 2400 yards east. At 0015 the favorable wind shifted to scatter the smoke and expose the light buoys to enemy gunfire. The blockships, already 2400 yards off course, were now blinded by their own smoke. Both ships ran aground far east of the target. Escape of the crews was effected with some casualties. The operation was a total failure.

Both attacks cost the British 176 killed, 412 wounded and 49 missing. Some of the latter, including one

Marine officer and 12 Marine enlisted, had been taken prisoner. Despite the intensity of the action at Zeebrugge, German casualties were light—an admitted 8 killed, although a good many were wounded. The discrepancy is not surprising in view of the British mission, the prepared defenses, and the unfortunate shift of wind that exposed the troop-laden *Vindictive* and later the *Iris* to direct enemy fire.

Keyes was still determined to block Ostend. In 2 weeks the *Vindictive*, a battered wreck, had been refitted as a blockship along with an old depot ship, the *Sappho*. On 8 May a new force sailed for Ostend. A boiler breakdown eliminated the *Sappho* but the *Vindictive* continued forward. At 0135 the enemy, probably having heard the small craft, covered the harbor approaches with searchlights. The attackers now opened up with monitor, air and siege gun bombardment.


At 0150 a heavy fog cut visibility to 300 yards. The *Vindictive*, after locating the entrance to Ostend with difficulty, groped smack into heavy fire from the shore. Her Captain was instantly killed. Command devolved upon a young lieutenant who swung her across the channel, then

sunk her. Escape was made in a sinking craft which backed out of the harbor pursued by machine gun fire.

Upon his return to England, Keyes discovered that his headquarters had announced the operation a success. In fact, the *Vindictive* lay grounded with a sufficient channel between her stern and the western piers to permit normal operations. Even when correctly advised, the Admiralty continued to regard the operation as a success. Because of this and because he was convinced that the enemy was using Ostend from the seaward, Keyes decided on a final operation.

By June, however, small submarines and torpedo-boats were able to pass the Zeebrugge entrance at high water. The neutralization of the Ostend canal would not, therefore, hamper enemy operations. Ostend also lay open to British siege gun and air bombardment and as a result was rarely used. For these reasons the operation was cancelled; it already had cost 197 killed, 413 wounded and 27 missing. Thus the entire action at Zeebrugge and Ostend amounted to over 1,200 British casualties.

Until the Zeebrugge action a suc-






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cessful blocking operation against an active defense is not recorded in history. A good deal of controversy surrounds appraisal of the Zeebrugge effort, but after weighing the facts one must conclude that it was a success.

There is first of all a tactical consideration. Mr. Churchill writes that Zeebrugge "was completely blocked for about three weeks and was dangerous to U-boats for a period of two months." Adm Keyes holds that Zeebrugge's usefulness to the enemy vanished completely until the 2 western piers were removed to enable small craft only to negotiate the entrance at high tide. Adm Scheer called the attack a failure, adding that "it was found possible for the U-boats to get round the obstruction, so that connection between the

harbor at Zeebrugge and the shipyard at Bruges was never interrupted even for a day." Aerial photographs clearly contradict the German opinion: besides showing the positions of the sunken ships, they prove that large numbers of craft remained inactive at Bruges for several weeks subsequent to the operation.

Admitting only a partial blocking still allows an impressive effect. Adm Scheer, talking about the period before the attack, laments the necessity of using Bruges because of delay caused by the lock: "... it took two and one-half hours to get 4 torpedo-boats through." Obviously additional delay, by slowing flotilla operations to a crawl, would eliminate them. And this is what happened.

In June, 1918, part of the submarine flotilla at Bruges was recalled

to Germany "because the submarine commanders were reporting that the passage of the Dover Straits was becoming increasingly difficult and hazardous." But at the same time numerous destroyers and torpedo-boats were berthed at Bruges. Why were there no raids on the Dover Patrol like that of the last February? Apparently enemy flotillas could not transit the Zeebrugge lock in sufficient force and speed demanded by surface raiding operations. Recall that the Zeebrugge-Ostend operation was not an isolated effort, but rather one of several measures adopted to eliminate enemy submarine passage through the Dover Straits. That the operation complemented the overall plan cannot be questioned in view of the June partial withdrawal of submarines from Flanders. It is by the complementary standard that this operation must be judged; as such, the final judgment is certainly favorable.

Although Keyes maintains that he undertook the Zeebrugge attack purely for military reasons, he would not argue that a great, albeit indirect, strategic victory resulted—a psychological one. The year 1917 had closed ominously for the Allies: the Italian rout at Caporetto, the failure of the Passchendaele offensive, the final collapse of Russia. Then in March, 1918, the German rolled forward to begin what Churchill later called the greatest onslaught in the history of the world. At a time when a pessimistic pall covered the Allied countenance, the British lion suddenly and daringly pounced on the enemy's camp. The international effect was so enormous that this has been called the real victory of the operation.

A final consideration remains: the amphibious assault that was involved. Child that it was, crude as its fashion and performance, its importance cannot be slighted. After Gallipoli amphibious warfare was dead. At Zeebrugge it was reborn for a new generation. **USMC**




Five Bells

I HAD MY RECRUIT PLATOON ON THE DRILL FIELD standing their 8th week inspection. They had been properly briefed on military time but not on the use of a ship's bell in recording it. The inspection was underway when the bell at the nearby Sea School clanged indicating the hour of 1030. The inspecting officer used the interruption to quick advantage. "Private," he snapped. "What does the ringing of that bell mean?" The private was equally fast. "Good Humor Man, sir," he replied.

AGySgt E. J. Thorn



AMSgt D. G. Brooks is congratulated by MajGen D. M. Shoup, CG, MCRD, Parris Island, upon being named as the first recipient of the Marine Corps Association's award to the honor graduate of the Sergeants Major Administration School at Parris Island.



The award, an engraved NCO swagger stick, was created by the Association as a result of a suggestion published in MESSAGE CENTER. The award will be made to the top graduate of each class at the Sergeants Major school.

AMSgt Brooks is stationed at MCB, 29 Palms.

Scheduled for testing by the Marine Corps, this full-track vehicle, called the T-116, can operate with a 3,000-lb payload as either a cargo or personnel carrier in loose sand, ice, soft marsh or inland water.



It has an all-welded aluminum hull with a glass-reinforced plastic cab and removable arctic and summer cargo compartment coverings.

An 8-cylinder, air-cooled engine gives it a land speed of 40mph. Cruising range is about 300 miles.

France's versatile antitank missile, the SS-11, is shown mounted on Republic Aviation's Alouette II helicopter.



The wire-guided missile is powered by a solid propellant and is described as being able to disable any known type of tank. It can be hand-carried, dropped by parachute, fired by a foot soldier, launched from the ground or launched from aircraft.

MajGen Thomas G. Ennis was named Inspector-General of the Marine Corps to succeed MajGen Homer L. Litzenberg who retired 31 May.

Gen Ennis, a veteran Marine aviator, recently completed an assignment as CG, 3dMAW, El Toro, Calif. MajGen Litzenberg, a veteran of the Nicaraguan Campaign, WWII and Korea, served as an enlisted man for 3 years after entering the Marine Corps in 1922.

The Army has contracted for production of an aluminum armored carrier to be manufactured by the Food Machinery and Chemical Corp.

The new vehicle is a 9-ton replacement for the current 20-ton steel M-59 carrier now in Army service. Both are tracked vehicles that cross rough terrain and inland waters. Each can carry a squad of infantrymen. The aluminum alloy plate used in the vehicle construction furnishes the same level of protection that the steel M-59 offers.

Designated the M-113, it can also be used as a missile launcher, mobile command post, communications center, resupply and evacuation vehicle.

Trial deliveries of production models are expected early in 1960.

Made of a vinyl synthetic material, a circular air-inflated structure that exhales air at a rate of 2,000 cubic feet per minute is being tested by the Marine Corps for possible use as a field maintenance shelter.




The tent is held down by sand or water ballast, is 37 feet in diameter and reaches a height of over 18 feet when fully inflated.

Guests of honor at the 3dMarDiv Association's national reunion this year will be the Division's 5 living Medal of Honor holders: Luther Skaggs, Jr., Washington, D. C.; John H. Leims, Parkville, Mo.; Hershel W. Williams, Huntington, W. Va.; LtCol Louis H. Wilson, Jr., MCS, Quantico; and Sp4 Wilson Watson, now on duty at the US Army General Depot, Nancy, France.

Under the direction of Tom Stowe, reunion chairman, the Division gathering will be held 17-19 July in Washington, D. C.

Mounted on a Swedish J-35 Dragon, the US Navy's air-to-air Sidewinder missile has been designated as standard armament in the Swedish Royal Air Force.



Guided by an infrared device which homes on heat emitted by the target's engine, the Sidewinder became the first guided missile to destroy enemy aircraft in combat when it was successfully employed by the Chinese Nationalists during the Quemoy incident last year.



friends — friends with the mission to give to the key man on the modern battlefield the vital assist to his maneuver: *support by fire*.

Fire support is a subject almost as broad as the modern battlefield. No man can claim to know the whole subject; he can only set forth his thoughts as building blocks for others to amplify or discard. Accordingly, this series of articles will deal with, in turn, the various supporting arms, target acquisition and processing, training and organization, and limited and unlimited war situations. These articles will be linked by this basic premise: we are all friends with the aim of supporting John Rifleman. There is no intention either to mangle or to preserve as antiques of the missile age anyone's command prerogatives. In a Marine Corps wherein specialists daily increase willy-nilly, the time has long since passed when anyone can claim to supervise, single-handed, every MOS he might meet in a day. That's why we have special staffs and specialized units. Rather, we the friends of John Rifleman, can best support him by know-how, understanding, and, above all, teamwork as professionals and Marines.

As a first step in developing the teamwork that will give John Rifleman adequate support by fire, professional Marines must broaden their outlook to become triphibious — knowledgeable of matters in the air, on land and sea. This article

will examine in particular those areas in which a broader outlook than that of battalion or squadron, 0302 or 7307, Acting Master Sergeant or Lieutenant Colonel, is required. Here are four such areas:

First, we must recognize the unique nature of the amphibious air-ground team, a task organization tailored to provide the most potent, yet most complex, fire support the armed forces of the world have known.

Second, we must develop the mechanics to run this machine — technicians who know the detailed idiosyncracies of not just one supporting arm, but of artillery, mortars, rockets, missiles, naval gunfire, and close air support; further, the use of each with either conventional explosives or atomic warheads.

Third, we must perfect plans of fire support which will truly support the desired scheme of maneuver when we ask a battalion to control an area larger than Pacific islands that two divisions fought for not so long ago. To do this with atomic fires is not easy, but we must be prepared also for limited war which certainly means limited fire support and may mean limited maneuver if fire support cannot be provided.

Finally, we must find simple and effective ways to decentralize the control and coordination of supporting arms. Regardless of the simplicity of the system, this will require more technicians and more


commanders of lower rank doing a higher-level job — requiring, in turn, more professional know-how.

The amphibious air-ground team has been thoughtfully pruned so that John Rifleman can trade his two and one half mile-per-hour field boots for the seven-league boots of the helicopter. In the pruning we all miss, or at least misplace, some of the impedimenta we have used in the past. In its place we must learn to use with increased effectiveness what we have left. The helicopter and the dispersed combat formation have stripped artillery of range, tubes, trucks, and massed fires. Economy and missiles are thinning out the gunfire ships and turrets while the helicopter moves us out of range. We have the nuclear weapon, but we'd like to keep it on the shelf. Even so, the air-ground team backs up John Rifleman with massive fire support. The wide-open spaces of the modern battlefield can unleash close air support for a starring role, while artillery and naval gunfire continue, at least until new weapons developments materialize, to provide slightly reduced, but impressive fires.

The problem here is that no one of the supporting arms can do the whole job alone. Technical capabilities and technical limitations must be considered. Fire support coordination used to be primarily a matter of avoiding mutual interference and ensuring safety among

three arms ready, anxious, and able to hit a given target. On the modern battlefield the means to attack a given target may be extremely limited. In fact, inadequate means may be available unless very careful advance planning has been done. Air support, for example, is very flexible when on station, but requires major planning to get it on station and keep it there.

Coordination and planning begin with staffs. Staff officers learn to coordinate and plan by schooling and by experience. Quite obviously the way to get the air-ground team concept working smoothly is to organize, to train, and to think as an air-ground team. The aviation-ground cross-training program has been a giant stride in this direction, supplementing the existing program of integrated courses at the Marine Corps Schools. The question is whether what we are doing is enough and whether it is feasible to do even more. Inevitably, a certain dichotomy must exist in the Marine Corps, with air and ground on separate branches of the tree. Training and organization constitute one valid reason, but parallelism to the Navy air organization which provides the money and aircraft is even more cogent. The Navy structure is now planned for change. Certainly there is no simple solution to integrating aviation more firmly into the general staff organization of HQMC. Personnel and money ceilings are two roadblocks. Further, there is a legitimate area of concern that in integration simply for the sake of integration, inadequate provision might be made for the specialized requirements and organizational characteristics which are inherent to amphibious aviation. In the long run, however, aviation, or any specialized field, has more to gain than to lose by being guaranteed representation at the inception of all plans and policies. Planners from the ground side would benefit from constant reminders of the peculiarities of aviation. Most important, joint air-ground planners would learn from each other the principles, the staff action, and the detailed techniques that will refine the air-ground team. The potential benefits indicate a need for further unbiased study to find ways and



A frequent contributor to the GAZETTE, **LtCol Greene** has served in the 1st, 2d and 3d MarDivs in billets ranging from FO to artillery regiment XO. His staff assignments include battalion and regimental S-3, assistant division fire support coordinator, and G-3 for RLT-MAG LEX 58-1; he has commanded C-1-10, H&S-1-10, and 4/11. He also served on the staff, COMPHIBPAC, as Shore Bombardment Officer.

means to lick the obstacles.

At the AirFMF, FMF level, generally the same problems exist. As in the Headquarters, we have now a high degree of coordination. Occasional slippage is more probably the result of people than of policies. However, as training exercises and war plans emphasize more and more the air-ground team, the honest question must be raised as to whether it is really possible to have too much coordination and teamwork. For example, exercise directives and maneuver director forces in the very recent past have omitted realistic play for the air component in scheduled major air-ground exercises.

For years, the Marine Corps Schools have been the basis of the shared common education and understanding which, with practice and doctrine, is the keystone of effective close air support. Certainly Quantico can lay claim to a good share of credit for the Navy-Marine system of close air support which is unparalleled in the world. In seeking greater progress, even greater integration of aviation instructors into the sections of the Educational Center is a possible approach. However, desirable as student integration may be, it simply is not possible to teach advanced features of aviation to ground officers at the same rate of advance, or vice versa. Basic facts and principles, yes, but not the advanced ones. The Marine Corps Schools, then, obviously must continue to serve as a focal point for both air and ground doctrine, and must provide the integrated basic instruction for our new air-ground doctrine. However, just as modern civil education finds it expedient to separate the slow learners and the fast learners, the MCEC might investigate possibilities of devoting a part of the curriculum to specialized

advanced classes wherein air and ground students are separated.

So far, integration has been used in the sense of joint aviation-ground matters. This is not the only area where close teamwork and cross-training prove essential. Consider the technicians in a Fire Support Coordination Center. Coordination of fires is, of course, a command responsibility and we'll get to that later. The officer tabbed as "Fire Support Coordinator"—in a purely technical sense—by the T/O is the artillery commander of the echelon involved. This officer is designated to have an additional MOS as an atomic weapons analyst. Further, at lower echelons he is invited to be his own naval gunfire expert. In any case, he is required to consider carefully, if not supervise in the exact meaning of the word, the work of the air and naval gunfire liaison officers. Likewise, air and naval gunfire representatives are programmed to be qualified atomic analysts. On occasion, by seniority, attrition, or just plain fatigue, they may find themselves fire support coordinators (technical). Clearly we have here in practice a four-sided MOS: air, artillery, naval gunfire, and atomic analysis, with an additional need-to-know requirement for access to the relatively black arts of fire support coordination and target information.

Fortunately, past and present training and career management programs have made a start on isolating and preserving such cross-trained technicians. A number of artillerymen have added both a naval gunfire and an atomic MOS to their serial numbers. FSCC personnel are high on the quota list for special weapons schools. Naval gunfire personnel now train with the artillery by T/O and vice versa. Further, some artillery officers are spotted into

the aviation cross-training program. Analysis of the requirements, beginning at BLT level, shows that acceleration of the program is required, particularly at lower echelons and ranks. Also, extension of the aviation-to-ground cross-training program to include artillery units would provide very helpful training to pilots in a one-package deal of naval gunfire, artillery, and ground atomic considerations. A further opportunity for closer integration involves no personnel, fiscal, or major command problems. This is for greater use of FSCC personnel in garrison for planning and training. Too often the FSCC is activated only as a problem begins. Accordingly, the exercise script lacks realistic play. Training will be discussed later, but it appears that since the division staff normally plans continuously the scheduling, scope, or details of future exercises, artillery/FSC representation as provided by T/O officers should be almost continuously present as a part of the staff. At regiment and battalion there is no continuing requirement, but there is a requirement for close liaison and for periodic conferences or joint plan-

ning periods.

The process of integration of fire support personnel must go down to the lowest levels. In the dispersed formation with a depleted manning level, the Marine Corps cannot afford the luxury of full-time specialized observers for 81mm mortars, artillery, and naval gunfire. Entering BLT commanders and their supporting artillery battery commanders frequently tie all observers in a BLT perimeter by wire to the FSCC, then assign the mission to the most suitable arm—using the liaison officer radios or experience to coach the observer on the procedures. The solution is obvious: simplified and similar conduct of fire procedures coupled with appropriate doctrine and training to provide an integrated web of observers.

Future detailed treatment will be given to the complex requirements for integrating the target information needs of all supporting arms into a rapid and responsive system of intelligence acquisition, processing, dissemination, and post-strike analysis. Let's simply say that artillery and infantry S-2s must get together, divide the staggering work load, and

quit duplicating each other's reports.

Now to examine the role of the infantry commander as the ultimate fire support coordinator (non-technical). Three basic things are happening to infantry commanders under modern doctrine: they are given more means task-organized under their direct control, they are given unfamiliar varieties of means such as Honest John and artillery weapons formerly seen only in rear areas, and concurrently they are given far vaster areas of terrain to control. The first requirement for the professional is obviously a much more intimate knowledge of the characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of these fire support means. If the traditional artillery mission of direct support gives way to attachment, infantry units will be in the position of a man switching from regular milk deliveries to owning a cow. They'll have to learn to feed and take care of the critter. This is being done. Exercises of reorganized divisions are rapidly disseminating much practical knowledge of familiar and unfamiliar weapons, communications, organizations, and logistics to commanders and their staffs.

The problem of how best to solve the control of large segments of terrain is not going to be solved immediately, since it is the crux of the problem of tactics for the modern doctrine. However, this much is clear. First, if a higher headquarters exercises detailed control of supporting arms close to a subordinate unit it will restrict the mobility and flexibility we seek to exploit. Second, with increased distances and more tenuous communications, a higher headquarters will have great difficulty controlling or coordinating fires close to any unit with required safety. Third, we need deep fires to deny the enemy the mobility we seek.

It appears then that the first requirement for organizing the wide open spaces is to draw some lines, representing control measures on a map. Basically, such lines will represent an agreement that on the far side of this line the division plans, controls, and coordinates; on the near side, the RLT does the job. Other lines divide up responsibilities between a Landing Force, its ground echelons and its air component;

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others between RLT and BLT. Infantry commanders and their staffs in order to play their key roles in the planning, control, and coordination of fires obviously need to be familiar with such control measures. But look at the variety of lines that has evolved in past wars. Here are a few: Bomb Line, Tactical Bomb Line, Forward Bomb Line, No-Fire Line, Straggler Line, Atomic Effects Line, LL Line, O-O Line, various unit boundaries, and the new term, Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR), to say nothing of the old standbys—MLR, COPL, and GOPL. These may explain why it used to be called linear warfare.

We are at the point of diminishing returns in coordination lines and controls. They take too much time when time is vital. They tie up too many staff personnel and communications. The requirement is to pass down means and authority to the lowest practical echelon. Each echelon will then plan, control, and conduct deeper fires. BLT will plan fires where RLT used to plan them; RLT will do part of the former Division job and so on. Here are some of the implications. Denying the enemy mobility and suppressing his atomic delivery means will take high priority. With reduced means and increased areas, careful planning and delivery of fires must continue around the clock in the deep areas. No longer can full-time use of all available means be parcelled out to subordinate units. A large slice of the pie must be saved for the senior headquarters' use in deep fires. This creates a dilemma, for to reach the deep targets the means may have to be placed with forward units, quite

likely even attached for logistic support, reliable communication, and local security. The distinction between attachment and direct support then becomes meaningless. Higher headquarters certainly has the prerogative to require an attached artillery unit to fire on an important target, subject only to the criterion of other immediate local commitments. Similarly, an isolated RLT CO would have not only the right, but the duty to coordinate firmly the activities of all elements in his area, whether direct support, general support, or just visiting. And we must not forget that such isolation is rapidly becoming the norm.

What we need, and need badly, is a good common-sense approach to the problems of fire support and fire support coordination. We need to decentralize fire support to lower echelons with smaller staffs, removing at the same time the encrustation of tradition. We can reduce the overabundance of control lines by the simple expedient of combining as many as possible. We can examine restrictive fire plans, reduce the restriction they now place on both air and ground weapons and emphasize the common-sense procedures of coordination by simple assignments of areas, targets, or times to the various weapons. We can reduce the problem of how much "control" a commander needs over his supporting weapons by simply being Marines and doing the job the best way we know how without standing on the ceremony of technical command prerogatives or the niceties of special staff relationships.

The major problem of fire support for John Rifleman today is to de-

centralize without losing flexibility or adding complexity. When we have worked out proper procedures in the Landing Force air-ground team, we must then make very certain that equivalent procedures prevail in the amphibious task force, which has a heritage of extremely centralized and detailed control.

The whole apparatus of the Marine Corps, Headquarters, schools, staffs, and commanders exists for one simple purpose: to point John Rifleman and get him there with the logistic and fire support he needs. We must recognize that the nature of the modern Navy-Marine Corps air-ground team is a fighting mechanism weighted with withering fires to support the fighting Marine.

To harness that fire power and use it as well as John Rifleman deserves, we must press the search to integrate not only Marine air and ground components, but also fire support specialists with each other and with the infantry they support. We must develop a new many-sided breed of fire support technicians, competent in all arms, and they in turn must assist commanders and staff officers who are equally many-sided. Knowledge is power, and the fire support trend of modern doctrine clearly requires us as professionals to know more and more how to do ourselves the functions that used to be performed by other, specialized units and by that old stand-by, "higher authority."

When you and I and John Rifleman get out of that chopper in Landing Zone Red, there just may not be much that higher authority or outside specialists can do to help us in the next 24 hours. USMC

Physical Drill

☛ OUR OCS PLATOON AT QUANTICO was undergoing its regular afternoon calisthenics. Each candidate was given a chance to lead the platoon through several exercises while our platoon leader and platoon sergeant observed for command presence, correctness of procedure, etc. One of the student officers had us duckwalk to the end of the parade field. All was fine until it came time to turn us around. There was an awkward pause while our leader hung his head apparently in deep thought. Suddenly he barked in his most commanding tone, "To the rear, DUCKWALK!"

1stLt D. H. Grafft

Matter of Taste

☛ DURING THE ANNUAL NATIONAL RIFLE MATCHES at Camp Perry, Ohio, not long ago, the Commandant of the Marine Corps made his usual inspection of the ranges being operated by Marines of the 2d Bn, 8th Marines. While in the butts he approached a young Pfc who snapped to rigid attention.

The General asked, "Son, are you licking and sticking?"

Without batting an eye the Marine answered, "No sir, tasting and pasting."

Capt J. F. Meyers, Jr.

CLOSING the GAP

By BGen R. E. Cushman, Jr.



• NO FINER DEVELOPMENT TOWARD achieving greater combat capability has come about than the recent directives from the Commandant which are designed to revive and revitalize the art of intelligence within the Marine Corps. BGen Masters amplified these orders and described CMC's desired goals in his *GAZETTE* article of last year. I would like to tie in to his down to earth thoughts by concentrating on just one of the objectives he outlined—development of an intelligence doctrine.

Everyone is a tactician—ask him! We have all read, or should have read, Sun Tzu—Clausewitz—Patton—Marine Corps Schools pubs—Mao Tse Tung. Countless Marines have contributed to our new operational concepts and doctrine: unit separation and vertical envelopment. But have you ever tried to find an officer who boasts of being an operational intelligence expert? Perhaps this is why our intelligence doctrine has not kept pace with our operational doctrine and it makes me say again that this new emphasis is much needed. We must close the gap!

Battlefield intelligence for Marine infantry units wasn't much in WWII. You hacked through the weeds 'til you collided with the enemy, or you stuck your head up and looked him in the eye anywhere from 50 feet to 50 yards away. On Iwo a patrol would sometimes get all the way from the rear to the front of its fox-holes before being pinned down! In short, WWI intelligence methods applied to WWII and were sufficient.

It seems to me our first clue that something new was needed came out of frozen Chosin. Here we had unit separation, large distances and an enemy attack which was a surprise in many ways—although suspected and prepared against by CG, 1st MarDiv and subordinate commanders.

The years since then have seen the new tactics and new organization developed, refined and practiced—but no real enemy to penalize poor intelligence procedure! The question now is—what do we have to do to close the gap between intelligence and operational doctrine?

First—what causes the gap? Aside from the greater interest in tactics of many commanders (now being corrected by CMC and HQ G-2) and the personnel problem of stabil-



BGen Cushman, who earned the Navy Cross at Guam during WWII, is Assistant (National Security Affairs) to Vice President Nixon. Commissioned in the Marine Corps upon graduation from the Naval Academy in 1935, one of his first assignments took him to Shanghai, China, with the 4th Marines. More recently he has served as Head of Amphibious Warfare Branch, ONR; Amphibious Plans Officer, CINCNELM; and on the faculty of the Armed Forces Staff College.

izing enough good officers within a unit so the CO can get a good S-2 in addition to a good XO, S-3, S-4 etc. (now being corrected by HQ G-1), there are, I think, four principal factors:

- 1) Increased distances between units and, initially, between Marines and enemy forces.
- 2) Replacement of linear battle formations with perimeter type.
- 3) Rapidity of movement of modern forces.
- 4) Requirement for spotting nuclear weapons targets at a distance from friendly forces.

Next, let's think about the way these factors influence the intelligence problem and what we can do about them. Not that any one of us has all the answers, but rather that all of us should start working on them in our own sphere.

Increased distances between our own units increase the need for surveillance and patrol contact, and make it harder to get information promptly to higher, lower and adjacent commanders. The greater distance to the enemy makes finding

him more difficult and a primary intelligence objective.

Linear battle formations made patrolling easy — straight forward on a front of fairly uniform width, with some increase of frontage in a beachhead situation. Patrols could come from front line units or the reserve. On the other hand, a perimeter formation presents us with an ever increasing patrol frontage and often no reserve from which to augment or replace front line troops for the task.

Rapidity of movement by helicopter, aircraft and vehicles drastically cuts down intelligence gathering, evaluation and dissemination time. This compounds the problem posed by the great initial distance which the enemy will place between his forces and the areas of probable nuclear preparation in which our troops will land and operate initially. Conversely, once he has located us, he will move quickly into contact to avoid nuclear attack, or will seek to drop one on us should we fail to keep on the move—a problem, if we don't know where the

enemy is! Thus intelligence is more than ever a grim race to locate the enemy before he finds us.

Finally, if nuclear weapons are used, it is evident we must locate our targets, fast moving targets no doubt, while at great distances from friendly forces so that at time of attack our men will not be endangered.

In my opinion, all of this says that no longer can we make do with front line foot patrols, small numbers of observation aircraft reporting only to higher headquarters, intelligence circuits crowded with other traffic and begrudged by all but the "2", and a minimum of special reconnaissance units.

While we're waiting for some electronic marvels (which take time and money and will never give us a guarantee a tube won't blow at the critical time) I suggest those concerned (all of us!) kick these and similar ideas around.

First, really make use of Marine aircraft at all levels of command. Intelligence gathering should be an air support function of equal or greater importance than attack missions. It's the only way we can cover these distances.

Second, employ motorized patrols to the greatest possible extent, tied in to the air reconnaissance system.

Third, make maximum use of specialized units, as described by BGen Nickerson in his article on the ForceReconCo, for continuous deep reconnaissance — again tied in to air reconnaissance. Perhaps we need others, at lower echelons, in addition to those we have.

Fourth, establish as SOP the areas and sectors to be covered by foot, motor, air, and deep patrols so that complete coverage is automatic.

Fifth, tie it all together with a "sacred" communications system — flash type.

Sixth, and last, work at it in the field. Hold intelligence exercises for the system components. Insure that every field exercise is opposed—not by canned messages but by thinking aggressors.

I realize this only scratches the surface, but at least it shows there's an itch! We have to close the gap described but there is no doubt Marines can do it just as we have for 183 years.

USMC





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Edited by Alexander Klein

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Louisiana State University Press
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In April 1861, the Hunter Rifles, Pvt Robert Patrick among them, climbed aboard the steamer *J. A. Cotton* at Port Hudson, La., and steamed down the Mississippi for New Orleans. Beginning his diary with this first war-time experience and continuing until the pathetic last days of the war, Robert Patrick takes us on a fascinating tour of the Confederacy behind the front lines.

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


DEDICATION of LEJEUNE HALL QUANTICO, VA.

"There is a wide and important field of usefulness for a military force with the characteristics of the Marine Corps. . . .

"The retention of that field of usefulness by the Marine Corps is dependent on its efficiency. In the hands of its officers, therefore, rests its future. If they allow the Corps to deteriorate, its mission . . . in peace and war will pass into stronger and more capable hands, and the Corps will be marked for extinction. On the other hand, if by dint of united, industrious and conscientious performance of duty the efficiency of the Corps be increased and become manifest to all, its future development and growth will be assured."

*Reminiscences of a Marine
John A. Lejeune, 1930,
Dorrance & Co., Inc.*




ON 21 MAY 1959 THE MODERN Marine Corps Schools Headquarters building was dedicated to the memory of the late MajGen John Archer Lejeune, the 13th Commandant of the Marine Corps. Honored guests included the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen R. McC. Pate; Gen G. C. Thomas, USMC (Ret); Miss Eugenia Lejeune, Miss Laura Lejeune and Mrs. James B. Glennon, daughters of MajGen Lejeune; and Capt James B. Glennon, USN (Ret).

Highlights of the ceremony were a dedicatory address delivered by Gen Thomas and the unveiling of a plaque by LtGen M. B. Twining, Commandant, Marine Corps Schools, in the presence of the daughters of MajGen Lejeune.

In addition to the plaque, a life size portrait of MajGen Lejeune and mementos including his two swords, personal decorations and original certificate which appointed him Commandant of the Marine Corps are on display in the lobby of Lejeune Hall.

MajGen Lejeune, one of the founders of the Marine Corps Association, had a long and distinguished Marine Corps career. As Major General Commandant (1920-1929) he organized Marine Corps Schools in the basic form retained today and initiated the study and experimentation which developed the successful amphibious warfare doctrine of WW II.

USMC



Mementos of MajGen Lejeune's 40-year career



CMC inspects Honor Guard upon arrival for ceremony.



(L to R) Capt and Mrs. Glennon, Miss Eugenia Lejeune, Gen Pate, Miss Laura Lejeune, Gen Thomas, and LtGen Twining.

OBSERVATION POST

FICTION TO KNOWLEDGE

✻ MCS, QUANTICO, VA. — The methods of obtaining opposition in tactical exercises are enumerated in 4 field manuals, all under the general classification of Military Intelligence, and pertain to Aggressor Forces. In the Marine Corps these aggressor forces are usually designated prior to an operation from regular units, which then go through a period of training to learn, among other things, a new language, history, government, and armed forces structure.

These aggressors are used primarily to provide an opportunity to maneuver against an actual opponent and, in addition, to provide a means of employing proper intelligence techniques to simulated combat. When employed with umpires, the closest approximation to combat situations are frequently encountered, and the training is enhanced accordingly.

The time factor in training such a designated aggressor unit is dependent almost entirely on how thoroughly the unit is required to imitate the aggressor forces described in Field Manual 30-101, and the organization and tactics described in FM 30-102. In any event, effort and time are necessary, and even a new language must be learned to some degree (causing a subsequent "study" by prospective interrogators of the opposing force). Esperanto, the official aggressor jargon, is derived from the Spanish, French, German, and Italian languages.

From the intelligence point of view practice is acquired in seeking information from POWs; documents and maps can be carefully studied and evaluated; and essential elements of information can be an-

swered, all with considerably more interest than can be obtained from canned messages. Also, the reasons for proper intelligence procedures are easier to understand by all personnel, and proficiency along all lines of combat intelligence has undoubtedly resulted. However, once the problem terminates, aggressor items of uniform, if worn, are turned in, the special organization disbanded; Esperanto is forgotten and units return to normal training schedules. In all likelihood, the same unit will



not be assigned as an aggressor again for a considerable period of time.

A method to exploit the time and energy in perfecting aggressor techniques would be for the Marine Corps to write its own Foreign Information Manual based on the composition and tactics of a particular foreign country—or even a series of manuals on several foreign countries. By this method the time spent studying aggressor forces would be utilized in gaining useful information about a country we may someday serve with—or in.

When an opposed problem is contemplated a specific Foreign Information Manual could be designated, and all participating personnel, in-

stead of spending time on a fictitious organization, could be studying an actual military force that exists in the world today and, in addition to the realism imposed by facing an opponent, energy would be exerted toward learning about a country and language that would be beneficial. No new type uniforms are necessary—knowledge and methods and not the physical appearance is what is important.

Used within the Marine Corps, this publication could be quite simple as much of the information needed is readily available and exists within many military libraries. Compilation of this existing information into one Foreign Information Manual on each country we would be interested in is all that would be required for training purposes. A concise history, including current political and economic trends, as well as the known structure of the armed forces, should be included. Also, a section on recognition of combat uniforms and equipment, types and markings of maps and related documents, and a glossary of the vocabulary similar to the pocket vocabularies of foreign languages which we are already familiar with, is needed. Next, a section on tactical doctrine and basic principles of offensive and defensive combat, with sufficient detailed information to give an understanding of tactics on a typical company, battalion, or possibly regimental operation is required.

For example, if the particular armed force consistently employs artillery and large masses of foot troops with practically no motorized support, such information could be sufficiently detailed to explain usual modes of movement, when and what actions indicate an attack, preparatory fires and how employed, methods of attack, reorganization, resupply, etc.

In every Marine unit of any size, we have personnel that speak, to some degree, various foreign languages, and possibly personnel who have graduated from one of the language courses while on duty with the Marine Corps. Their greatest

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The GAZETTE will pay \$15.00 for each letter published in the Observation Post
★

difficulty is retaining their proficiency—which can only be done by using the language. Why not put this talent to practical use in our opposed field problems? If we go to a foreign country at any time anyone with even the most elementary knowledge of that language becomes indispensable. So let's use our normal training to give these individuals a chance to practice and brush up on their linguistic ability.

Based on these Foreign Information Manuals, opposing Marine forces could employ the tactics and language of countries where the knowledge gained can be both beneficial and true information. It is well worth while to know how a foreign unit thinks and operates—be they on your flanks and attacking with you—or in front of and opposing you.

Capt M. E. White

RIFLEMAN TO CHOPPER

• MCAF, NEW RIVER, N. C.—Situation: Helicopter approaching while ground unit is receiving small-arms fire. How to warn the pilot?

Situation: Have a casualty to be evacuated and helicopter in sight. How to tell the pilot?

These are only two incidents where ground forces need to talk to or signal helicopters. At the present time there is no standard set of signals in use for riflemen to communicate with helicopter pilots. There is a definite need for a set of uncomplicated and simple signals.

In the hands of the rifle companies are VS-4 panels or, as they are commonly called, "front-line marker panels." Combine these panels with a simple code and we have the answer to the above problem. As noted, the code must be kept simple and short. The rifleman's needs are fairly simple in themselves: *water, food, ammo, there is danger, casualty evac* and *am moving* round out the necessary small talk. Through different arrangement of marker panels this information can be passed to the helicopter.

The accompanying illustration shows the various arrangement of the panels to spell out the proper signal. It must be kept in mind that under ordinary circumstances the company will not be in radio con-

tact with the supporting aircraft, hence the need for visual signals.

During operations in the Hawaiian area, our company found itself time after time being supported by helicopters. Due to the lack of signals we did not realize the full worth of the aircraft. On several oc-



casions the aircraft were declared shot down by umpires due to arriving in the company area while the area was receiving small arms fire.

Under actual combat conditions it is doubtful that pilots would be able to observe the fire. On one occasion there were a number of actual casualties from heat prostration. It was desired that these be air evacuated since our support was limited to helicopters. Planes arrived at the company zone a number of times with supplies carried externally but due to lack of signals the pilots were not made aware of a need to land and receive the casualties. On other occasions, helicopters would approach carrying supplies after orders had been received to move out. It was not practical for the company to accept the supplies under these conditions but once again—no signal!

Adoption of this simple set of signals would enable the rifle company or patrol personnel to communicate with supporting aircraft. It has been proposed that numbered

panels be employed to meet this need. In my opinion this is not practical as loss of the particular number panel needed would make signaling in this manner useless. The need is there. This is an answer.

AGySgt M. M. Murray

SQUARES INTO ROUND HOLES

• CAMP LEJEUNE, N. C.—Each year the Marine Corps loses man-hours and money through the misplacement of personnel. More serious by far than any monetary loss, however, is the fact that men ill-suited for their billets may function in those positions in the event of a combat situation. One day lives will be lost because the wrong man occupies a crucial billet.

Pausing momentarily from our general theme, allow us to establish here our full recognition of the truth that a good military man will do his best no matter what the nature of his assignment. Nevertheless, we stand cognizant of another equally valid truth. If two men, endowed with a similar devotion, are pitted against each other, more likely than not the one possessed of enthusiasm and innate ability or aptitude will do the better job. With the foregoing in mind, we continue.

Haphazard assignment and imprudent selection occur frequently in the case of service schools. A reluctant history major is sentenced to Photo Interpretation School or an ordnance course. A disgruntled math major is sent to Naval Justice School or the PIO Course. Men, minus aptitude and attitude, are used as quota fillers. Division wants a warm body, so regiment and battalion send just that in the form of the most readily available company grade officer.

If and when mild and discreet protests do arise, they are either ignored or overridden. Disappointment and apprehension are assuaged by quotations relevant to the amount of per diem to be collected or by remarks germane to the choice location of the particular school.

Through misplacement the Corps not only fails to realize the maximum returns from its investment but also does itself a definite detriment. The morale of the individual rele-

gated to a school or course in which he has no interest, or for which he feels that he possesses no aptitude, suffers. Inwardly, at best, the individual bristles at the lack of consideration paid to his talents or preferences. The chances of the development of a career Marine dwindle.

Furthermore, and of much import, since attendance at a formal protracted service school leads to the acquisition of a secondary MOS, the damage extends further. A man may, and probably will, be employed in a field for which he is totally unsuited.

If (and it ranks as highly unlikely) the Marine's performance becomes noticeably poor, he will be relieved. More likely than not, the man will execute his duties in an adequate fashion. His work, however, will not be outstanding. To one degree or another, the finely honed combat cutting edge of the Marine Corps will have been dulled.

We suggest here, not by any means a panacea, a simple system by which the battalion S-1 section may help preclude the birth and growth of mediocrity within our Corps.


As a company grade officer or NCO (E-4 and above) reports aboard for duty with the battalion, require him to fill out a page-long mimeographed questionnaire. The questions to which we desire answers are: full name, rank, serial number, MOS or MOSs, service schools attended, class standings achieved, civilian education and employment, GCT score and, of more import, GCT component test scores.

Direct the subject to state briefly in the small space provided for same what he believes to be his aptitudes and talents, if any. Below the foregoing remarks allow him to state in order of preference his first five choices pertinent to service schools. If necessary allow the subject to consult a list of such schools.

Admittedly the answers to many of the aforementioned questions can be found in an officer's qualification jacket or in an NCO's record book. Conversely, a qualification jacket or record book does not contain a statement of self evaluated talents or a list of preferences. In addition, qualification jackets or record books, in many cases, will not indicate a man's class standing in any schools attended.

Utilizing the proffered sheet, one can compare written preference with standings already achieved. Such comparison furnishes S-1 with a gauge for evaluation and a basis for prediction. With this single proposed sheet in his immediate possession the personnel officer holds a concise, personalized ready reference, one to which he may refer without sending to the companies or batteries for record books.

We stress the statement of GCT component test scores. Total scores reveal little. Individual component marks will more readily denote the Marine's specific abilities. For example, a pattern analysis score will



reveal more of a man's chances of absorbing material taught in a technical course than will his total score. His high overall score may be the direct result of an exceptionally fine reading-vocabulary mark, something which has little bearing on the technical. Thus the total score might very well deceive the examiner.

While on the topic of GCTs, we take the opportunity to digress. It would seem that for some unknown and unfounded reason, Marine officers have come to regard the members of their ranks as omnipotent and omniscient. We arbitrarily exempt ourselves from the scrutiny to which we unhesitatingly subject the Marine enlisted man.

An officer, because he is an officer, undergoes no GCT screening prior to his assignment to a school. By media of our attitudes, we blithely and tacitly assert that because a man has exhibited sufficient mental equipment to earn a commission he therefore stands eminently qualified for any and all schools or fields of endeavor. Intentionally or otherwise, his talents and aptitudes are construed as being all-encompassing. Sadly, such is not the case in actuality.

Although each and every officer

should be able to master the matter taught at most service schools some are better qualified for certain pursuits than others. We must spend as much time and effort in the selection of officers to be sent to school as we do with enlisted men.

Certainly, it ranks as incongruous that we should painstakingly and diligently select the most eminently qualified enlisted personnel for a technical section and then place at their head officers not as well suited. Logically, we must exercise as much diligence in the appointment of the commander as is exerted in the selection of his men.

Returning to our proposed personnel aptitude and preference sheets, we view the scene from another angle. At the worst, companies or batteries have been known to use school quotas as a means of exiling the least desirable of their personnel. At best, the former have exhibited a marked reluctance to send their best men off to sundry schools. The temptation to retain the services of a highly competent man for your own outfit or unit ranks as a hard one to overcome. Battalion's possession of a complete picture of the individual might serve to remove such temptation from the none too smooth path of company and battery offices.

Considering still another facet of the question, we note that previously stated preferences might deter the development of fictitious enthusiasm for a particular course, that is, an eager interest inspired by the prospect of a change of scenery or the receipt of a supplement to income in the form of per diem.

Since 10 November 1775, the title, United States Marine, has been regarded as synonymous with the best, the elite. If we are to be ready for all contingencies, if we are to remain the elite, we must endeavor at all levels to install the most eminently qualified men in each and every billet within our Corps. We have within our ranks some of the most highly talented individuals to be found in any military service the world over. The utilization of personnel preference and aptitude sheets, we hope, is a step toward maintaining the USMC as the world's finest fighting organization.

1st Lt J. F. O'Connor

Marine Corps Gazette • July 1959



FORGING A NEW SWORD

WILLIAM R. KINTNER in association with JOSEPH I. COFFEY and RAYMOND J. ALBRIGHT. 238 pages. Harper and Brothers, N.Y. \$4.50

Since its creation in 1947, the Department of Defense has been the subject of almost continual controversy over ways and means to improve its operation. Fundamentally, the issue has centered around how much authority to grant the Defense Department—whether it should have complete control over the entire military establishment or whether its powers should be restricted by various checks and balances. In *Forging a New Sword*, the authors review the evolution of the present top-level organization and state the case for an all-powerful Defense Department, along with a 12-point program to correct deficiencies which they say “have complicated, confused, and slowed the decision-making process within government and hampered the control of operational military forces.”

After much debate the National Security Act was finally signed into law by President Truman on 26 July 1947, thus for the first time unifying the military departments into a newly-created National Military Establishment under the general authority, direction, and control of a civilian Secretary of Defense. Created also by this legislation were the Air Force as a separate and equal service, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, and various boards for interservice and interdepartmental coordination. Dissatisfaction with limitations placed upon the authority of the Defense Secretary soon led to the first major amendments to the National Security Act. Passed in 1949, these amendments gave increased authority to the Secretary of Defense and at the same time reduced the power and stature of the 3 military service secretaries, though specific provisions required the armed services to be

separately administered and prohibited the Defense Secretary from transferring or consolidating any combatant functions (such as dissolving the Marine Corps or consolidating naval aviation with the Air Force).

Early in 1953 under the new administration of President Eisenhower, the Rockefeller Committee on Defense Organization completed a study which became the basis for Reorganization Plan No. 6. As stated in the President's message transmitting this plan to Congress, the 3 basic objectives to be attained were clear and unchallenged civilian responsibility, effectiveness with economy, and military plans incorporating the most competent thinking from every point of view—military, scientific, industrial and economic. In the absence of action by Congress, Reorganization Plan No. 6 became effective on 30 June 1953. This change strengthened the power of the Defense Department by increasing the number of assistant secretaries, transferring the functions of certain boards to assistant secretaries, redefining the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and giving the JCS Chairman some authority over the Joint Staff.

William R. Kintner and Joseph I. Coffey are Army colonels, and Raymond J. Albright is a Foreign Affairs Officer in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. All have served in the Defense Department as well as other agencies of the government in Washington. As seen by the authors, the prime weakness of the present Defense Department stems from each service supporting concepts which enable it to claim a decisive role in national security and then according to the authors, seeking control of the weapons and elements necessary to carry out that role independently. To correct this alleged weakness, the authors propose a 12-point program of reforms

in order to give the Secretary of Defense greatly increased authority over the military services. Principal changes recommended are the establishment of unified and specified commands directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense, removal of the service chiefs from the JCS, ending of independent access by the JCS to the National Security Council, and development of a performance budget at Defense Department level based upon military tasks and missions.

Written prior to the third major reorganization plan passed by Congress in 1958, this book does not include any discussion of the latest changes. Important to note, however, is that many of the authors' recommendations were included in this legislation, and those not included will undoubtedly appear in future reorganization plans brought before Congress. The authors believe that the fundamental boundaries between land, sea and air warfare have been made archaic by technological advances, and they have written this book to convince the reader that there is no room in the atomic and missile age for separate services (the Marine Corps included). Complete integration of the armed forces is not recommended now by the authors only because “the time is not yet ripe.” The next decade is almost certain to see concerted efforts made to do away with separate military services. For an outline of the arguments which will be advanced by those who support these efforts, *Forging a New Sword* is a book well worth reading.

Reviewed by Col K. C. Houston
Ed: Col Houston, MCS, Quantico, Inspector, is a student of Department of Defense organization history and has done considerable reading on the subject.

THE BIG RED SCHOOL HOUSE

FRED M. HECHINGER. 240 pages, bibliography. Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, N.Y. \$3.95

There is—and has been for some time—widespread agreement that American schools have grave deficiencies. However, there are few who agree as to just what the deficiencies are, or how to correct them.

Since 5 October 1957 many people—including some educators—have recommended that we adopt the Russian system. They point to Sputnik, and a succession of similar startling accomplishments, and say that

we must follow suit. They reason that we may emulate the Soviet advances only through imitation of the Soviet system of education.

Mr. Hechinger does not agree with this thesis. Why he does not makes interesting reading. It is important reading too, and highly informative. He is thoroughly familiar with American schools, and he has examined in detail an extensive bibliography which deals with education in Russia. The critical analysis he makes of the two systems is based upon their historical development and their cultural antecedents.

In 1917 the Bolshevik government inherited an educational system as good as any in Europe. It was designed to serve only the children of the upper classes, however, and that was one reason it was doomed to early extinction. Another, more important reason was that the Bolsheviks wanted the revolution to be complete, and before building their own educational system they had to destroy the old one. It is Mr. Hechinger's hypothesis that they did so by means of deliberate excesses in the progressive method. They car-

ried permissiveness to absurd extremes. The students were given not only free rein, but control. Grades and examinations were abolished, and with them went the last vestiges of the teacher's authority. He could not even demand a minimum fare of learning and knowledge in retaliation.

By the late 1920s the old order was destroyed. In the 1930s and later the communist purpose could be served with a highly disciplined, subject-centered curriculum. In this there was great emphasis on talent, and intellectual achievement. Each teacher was—and is—required to be a scholar in his field. And there is much Soviet lip-service to "mass" education.

It is the post-progressive Russian system that has intrigued many Western observers. Mr. Hechinger admits that the system has merits. Obviously it has produced some extremely competent scientists. Relative to the monetary recognition paid the teacher by the Soviet state, he says: "It is one of the great ironies of this century that a police state thinks more highly of its teach-

ers than its policemen." But we are advised to look behind the facade. "The fact is," Mr. Hechinger writes, "that the Russian school, despite its claim of equal opportunity and its surface guise of American-style mass education, has done no more and no less than to serve the aims and purposes of its own philosophy: to provide the required number of educated men and women to carry out the plans and functions determined by the State."

Mr. Hechinger thinks we already have a good framework for our system. He sees no need to copy from another country, however spectacular its apparent success. Besides, "there is a world of difference between an educated man in a free society and an educated man in a slave society." We want, and need, citizens of broad and liberal education. However, even though our goals are different, there is still need for many changes in our schools. Principal among Hechinger's recommendations are:

1) Establishment of national minimum educational requirements for high school graduates. These should be in accord with the recommendations made by Dr. James B. Conant after his two-year survey of American high schools.

2) Establishment of a National Board of Educational Advisors, appointed by the President. This board should determine national minimum requirements, and give policy guidance to schools at all levels. However, it should have nothing to do with matters of personnel, methods of teaching, curriculum or selection of textbooks.

3) Greatly expanded federal aid to education.

The author is well qualified to advance his ideas. Aside from the detailed knowledge of the subject evidenced by this noteworthy book, he is a former education editor of the New York *Herald Tribune*, and is at present Associate Publisher of the Bridgeport (Conn) *Sunday Herald*, as well as Education Editor of *Parents Magazine*.

Reviewed by Maj J. M. Jefferson, Jr.

Ed: Maj Jefferson is the author of a recent *GAZETTE* article ("Innocents Abroad," Jan '59) stressing the importance of training linguists in the Marine Corps. He is a member of the Policy Analysis Division, HQMC.

Marine Corps Gazette • July 1959

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THE RUSSIANS IN THE ARCTIC

TERRENCE ARMSTRONG. 182 pages, illustrated. Essential Books, Fair Lawn, N.J. \$4.50

The Arctic region encompasses one-seventh of the total world land mass. Russia controls nearly one-half of this area. During the past 30 years, Russia has been increasingly active in Arctic exploration. The reason for Russia's increased interest and activity in the Arctic is clearly evidenced by the results of its efforts: exploitation of the Arctic region and its people.

Mr. Armstrong, in his book, *Russians in the Arctic*, presents an account of Russian activities in the Arctic region. A significant portion of the book is devoted to geographic exploration, historic sea voyages and air expeditions. Included is a detailed account of the voyage of the *Sedov* which began as a routine 3-month trip from Arkhangelsk to the Arctic and return, but was involuntarily extended into a two and a half year struggle against time and nature. On the return trip, the *Sedov* in convoy with two other ships encountered impenetrable ice and the prospect of reaching open water became hopeless. The 217 men and women on board the ships, many of them passengers returning to Russia after completing Arctic assignments, faced a realization of their worst expectations; they were stranded in a sea of solid ice. For the next two years, a dramatic fight for survival continued within the isolated group. After a few months, an adequate landing strip was fashioned from the ice near the ships and all but 33 men were evacuated by air. These remaining men wintered that year, and the next year, before conditions improved enough to permit ice breakers in to escort the marooned vessels to safety.

While the party was isolated, constant weather readings were taken and recorded, ice temperature and thickness were measured and marine life under the ice was studied. Ships positions were checked daily, and it was determined that they had drifted with their ice floe prison as much as 200 miles in one month. Finally, on 13 January 1940, after 812 days and 3800 miles of ice-locked drift, the ships were freed by the ice-breaker *Stalin* and enabled to return home.

Possibly the reader will find Chap-

ter 6, "Soviet Rule and the Peoples of the Arctic," the most interesting and informative portion of the book. Russian conquest of the Arctic began in the 10th Century with advances into the region of the White Sea and Pechora River. Late in the 16th Century, Russians invaded Siberia. Since that time, control of Siberia has continued to increase to the degree of domination we see today.

The author indicates the majority of his information was limited to what Russia has released. The material is well presented and interesting, and leaves the reader wondering about the true extent of Russian development and exploitation of the Arctic. Mr. Armstrong concludes with the thought provoking fact that Russia established more Arctic stations than any other country in Geophysical Year 1957-58.

Terrence Armstrong is the Assistant Director of Research at Scott Polar Research Station, Cambridge, England. He is an authority on the Arctic and is the author of *The Development of the Northern Sea Route*.

Reviewed by 1stLt R. K. Biel
Ed: The reviewer is Assistant Secretary at MCLFDC, Quantico.

COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS

PHILLIP A. FISHER. Harper & Brothers, N.Y. \$3.50

A "how to do it" book on investment in common stocks.

The outcome of a campaign is the product of the cumulative effect of the factors present. Similarly, the stock market represents the net effect of the interplay of the various economic causes and effects. The study of either matter can be infinite and fascinating. While the stock market is beyond the professional endeavors of the Marine officer, it may be deserving of consideration for the conduct of his personal affairs. Just recently a Federal Reserve report indicated a larger amount of currency and credit available than has been the case in recent years. This has been coupled with an outflow of gold, and is regarded as symptoms of the "flight from the dollar." The stock market, which has reached historic highs, is reflecting this phenomenon. Common stocks, as real property, are regarded as hedges against inflation. Should one elect

this form of investment, and it is to be recommended to those on a fixed income, the selection of the proper stocks can be a matter of considerable importance.

The author of this book has some competence in this area, as a professional securities analyst and the manager of his own investment counseling service. The book is premised upon his most successful investments. His unsuccessful ones might have proved equally interesting.

Fifteen principles are advanced which are to be mastered and followed in determining the stock of your choice. This approach coupled with 10 "don'ts" promises to provide "tested, successful, unconventional advice on how big money is made in the stock market."

The principles advocated are worthwhile, sound, and provide background guidance. The tenets are most applicable to those who have a lot of money to invest, who have ample time to make the investment, and who are able to and wish to effect a detailed investigation of the companies under consideration. This includes discussing the company affairs with its officers.

The author's service background is Army Air Corps, but some Navy contamination is indicated since this system is denoted as the "scuttlebutt" approach. Albeit a sound system, one would require money, time, energy, inclination and background.

Verdict: sound information scaled for those with the means and proclivity. For the rest of us with small sums to invest at odd intervals, who lack the ambition to become investment counselors, this book is of limited value.

To those seeking the hot tip (and remembering that none of the financial fraternity will ever make a specific recommendation) the author by inference commends such "blue chips" as Dupont, IBM and Dow. And for those who really want to reach for one and can afford the risk, try P. R. Mallory, Litton, Metal Hydrides or Elox. (Note: Not responsible for the outcome; suggest investigation of distilleries—in case of bankruptcy you can liquidate the stock).

Reviewed by Col W. R. Collins
Ed: Col Collins is President of the Marine Corps Tactics and Techniques Board, MCLFDC, Quantico.

BLOCKADE: THE CIVIL WAR AT SEA

ROBERT CARSE. 279 pages, photographs, appendices and index. Rinehart and Co., N. Y. \$5.00

Most accounts of the Civil War would have one believe that the heroics were largely provided by the land forces. To correct this false impression, Robert Carse has written an exciting story of the redoubtable men in ships who brought the beans and bullets for the Confederacy through the Union blockade. This blockade was maintained in turn by equally valiant albeit more numerous sailors of the US Navy.

No doubt the author's earlier work on piracy promoted his research for the present book, *Blockade*. Any Lafitte or Blackbeard who flew the skull and crossbones in an earlier age, would have found all the adventure he could handle in steaming from Nassau, Bermuda or Halifax—source of most Confederate supplies—to Wilmington, N. C. through a mighty array of Federal warships.


From numerous records and contemporary accounts of these operations, the author has given us a vivid picture of the individual exploits of the men involved. Outstanding among the many Confederate captains were John Wilkinson, who brought his ship through the blockade 21 times in 10 months, and James Maffitt, who likewise was never captured in spite of many hair-raising escapes. But there were many others who contributed to this valiant logistical effort which added up to some 2,054 known attempts made to enter or leave Carolina ports between 19 April 1861 and 17 February 1865. Despite any action the US Navy could take 1,735 were successful.

A large measure of this success can be attributed to another relatively unsung hero of the Confederacy, Col William Lamb. His installation and operation of the artillery pieces at Fort Fisher enabled the port of Wilmington to remain open until the last days of the Confederacy. The signal codes which Col Lamb devised and the seacoast artillery support which his batteries furnished to incoming blockade-runners made their operations possible.

Fort Fisher, to be sure, has particular interest to Marines because

the Corps participated in its capture in the closing days of the war.

Throughout the book, the contrast between the luxury of the British ports and the austerity of Confederate ports reflects the grim effects of the war upon the South. As the years wore on, this comparison became more appalling. The effect of war upon a blockaded country is best revealed by this statistic. Quinine cost \$2.80 gold an ounce on the



dock in Nassau. It was sold for as much as \$1200 Confederate currency an ounce in the Carolina ports. Currency could buy, at 10 cents a pound, cotton which in Nassau was sold for 50 cents gold a pound.

No doubt this book will be criticized by the Civil War scholar who concerns himself with precise dates and detailed footnotes. However, the general reader who enjoys a lusty story of the sea will find it an exciting narrative.

Reviewed by LtCol H. W. Edwards
Ed: LtCol Edwards, now serving with the Joint Staff, US Forces, Japan, is a former Head of the Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC.

NATURE IS YOUR GUIDE

HAROLD GATTY. 280 pages, illustrated. E. P. Dutton, Inc., N. Y. \$4.95

No reader of this book should ever after lose his way and every journey he makes should gain greatly in interest. Every outdoorsman, which means just about every Marine, should read it. Harold Gatty, a great navigator in his own right, has studied the uncanny ways in which primitive man moved unerringly across ocean, through jungle and over deserts without map or compass. To this lore, gathered from many races from Eskimo to Polynesian, he has added the trained observation of a naturalist and the knowledge of a modern navigator.

The author starts out by showing us at some length, that there is no such thing as a sixth sense which

gives direction. The basis of the amazing feats of direction-finding which can be performed, and not only by primitive people, is acute observation; knowing what to look for and training to read the signs which lay at hand everywhere. Life in cities and modern aids to travel have dulled some of our senses, but *Nature Is Your Guide* shows how to bring them into play again.

The book gets down to practical advice: why we walk in circles without a guiding mark; how to move in a straight line in featureless or in very broken country; how to use our ears, nose and eyes to perceive and interpret correctly what they tell us.

Harold Gatty then goes on to show us what to look for among natural features. Direction from wind effects, from vegetation, by the habits of animals, the position of plants and the shape of trees.

Did you know that one of the most common weeds in America has leaves which always point north and south? That the bark of trees is thicker on the north side? That ant hills can be signposts as clear as those made of wood or steel?

This book does not deal with any one part of the world. There are chapters on finding your way in the mountains, in polar regions, at sea, in the desert and even in towns.

Harold Gatty was an Australian. In 1931 he navigated Wiley Post in his record 8-day trip around the world. Although not a national he became Director of Air Navigation Research and Training to the US Army Air Corps. By special act of Congress he was awarded the DFC. During WWII he was a Group Captain in the Australian Air Force and became Director of Air Transport, under Gen MacArthur, to the Allied Air Forces. Shortly after he finished this book Harold Gatty died suddenly at his home in Fiji.

Although the book is stuffed with facts it is enlivened by interesting stories and illustrations. Nonetheless it is almost a reference book for the outdoorsman.

Reviewed by LtCol F. N. Grant, RM
Ed: The reviewer is a Royal Marine and is presently serving as a special instructor with the Liaison Section, MCEC, MCS, Quantico.

NO TOMORROW—NO YESTERDAY

WADE BURKHART. 294 pages. Pageant Press, Inc., N.Y. \$3.50

No Tomorrow—No Yesterday is a story of an American submarine and her crew patrolling Japanese waters during WWII. It is an intimate story of life aboard one of America's undersea marauders, describing with unusual insight the conflicts, the emotions, the apprehensions, the acts of heroism, the boredom experienced by men confined within the protective walls of their ship—the *Skullfish*.

One by one the main characters are introduced with consummate skill. Charley Schultz, the skipper, is a regular officer who lacks the warmth, the feeling for others, the understanding of his fellow man so essential to lead men in hours of extreme peril. Wade Burkhardt says, "Charley Schultz didn't mind being hated by his officers. He relished the idea. They were his playthings. They had to do exactly as he told them." Lt (jg) Brenner, the new officer aboard ship, makes up for what he lacks in professional background with understanding of human nature, enthusiasm and, when needed, prodigious valor. There is "the Colonel," a skinny little man who is thoroughly competent in his job yet constantly apprehensive of his imagined shortcomings; Al Taylor, a reservist is the executive officer; Frankie Hoffman, a good enlisted man but lacking as an officer; and Lt Don Barr the millionaire's son from Chicago. All go into the melting pot to make the crew of the *Skullfish* come alive.

No Tomorrow—No Yesterday carries the reader from the problems of preparing a crew for combat through the tense moments of battle surrounded by a hostile force determined to keep the *Skullfish* at the bottom of the harbor of Kare Shime off one of the Kuriles. What is particularly good about this book is the element of realism and adherence to actual conditions of war.

The skipper is eventually relieved by his superiors for reasons so obvious to the reader and yet unknown to the end by Charley Schultz.

The author is a veteran of submarine service and has 3 patrols deep in enemy waters to his credit. A graduate of the US Naval Academy and a former editor of *Our Navy*, Mr. Burkhardt is eminently qualified

to write about the silent service.

For those who like to get the feel of the silent service, to know what it is to be cooped up in a submarine for weeks on weeks cruising under hostile waters, *No Tomorrow—No Yesterday* is highly recommended.

Reviewed by LtCol H. W. Card, Jr.


Ed: LtCol Card is presently serving with the Marine Sub-section, MAAG, Taiwan.

SPACE RESEARCH AND EXPLORATION

D. R. BATES, 280 Pages. Wm. Sloane Associates, N. Y.

The topic today is, and tomorrow will be, the new frontier—space and the conquest of space. With the advent of Sputnik there appeared on the news stands and in the book

stores a profusion of articles and books on the subject of the conquest of this unknown, running the gamut from highly technical to science fiction. *Space Research and Exploration* is a collection of articles by a group of British scientists, each outstanding in his particular field. The book is organized in such a way and the articles are written in such a manner as to be quite readable by the average Marine who is excited about this new topic and who wants to get a general picture of where we are today technologically and what problems must be overcome before travel among the planets is realized. As mentioned, the tenor of the articles is relatively free of complex



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equations and derivations. These are left to the appendix section and even there one is able to follow the supporting material.

To adequately review the book would require commenting on each article. This is not practical here. However, the articles on cosmic radiation, meteor hazards, the satellite program, interplanetary orbits and medical and biological problems were the most interesting. The article on rockets and propulsion might have spent more time on the theory and effects of varying the basic parameters in relation to achievement of different payloads and altitudes. In spite of this it is possible to see that the prospects for propulsion are so overwhelming that even their sober assessment appears wildly imaginative. One will find that the book can be used as a general reference by teenagers in high school as care has been taken to express the underlying scientific principles in quite intelligible terms. For example, it is readily seen that only a 40 per cent increase in the speed of some of the present rockets will enable escape from our planet's gravitational field. The jump to the inter-planetary missile is of this order of magnitude.

Astronautics is a field in which not to be speculative is to be unrealistic, even misleading. It is so great a challenge to the human imagination that it cannot be ignored.

Reviewed by Dr. E. Wise

Ed: Dr. Wise heads the Science Section, Development Branch, G-4 Division, HQMC.

A CASE HISTORY OF HOPE

FLORA LEWIS. 267 pages. Doubleday & Co., Garden City, N.Y. \$3.95

In the fall of 1956 the Soviet empire was shaken to its foundations by violent outbreaks of resistance in

the Eastern European satellites. Shrewdly and ruthlessly, and with the help of a good dash of luck, Nikita Krushchev contrived to weather the storm (and, incidentally, to establish himself in the process as the sole successor of Stalin). The crisis culminated in the courageous, sanguinary revolt of the Hungarians. It was triggered off by a political upheaval in Poland, less spectacular than that which occurred a few days later in Hungary, but much more far-reaching in its effects. Flora Lewis' *A Case History of Hope* is a chronicle of Poland's defiance of Russian overlordship, defiance which in the end manifested itself in the anti-Soviet coup of 19 October 1956.

The authoress quite obviously loves Poland and the Poles. This is what gives her the deep understanding and the sure insight with which she examines what happened to the Polish people in a decade of communist rule, what caused their despair, and what made them, after long years of passive suffering, hit out against their tormentors. Yet Flora Lewis remains a realist. Her word pictures of the leading actors in the Polish drama are untainted by likes or dislikes. She does not close her eyes to those motives for the events she describes which do no credit to the Poles. Thus she points to the role which anti-Semitism played in the attack on such Polish Stalinists as Jakub Berman and Hilary Minc; and most important for us to remember, she shows clearly that the anti-Soviet opposition in the satellites is, for the present at least, being led by ideological communists sickened by "the vulgar fascism under a red banner" which in the USSR passes for Marx-Leninism. Her account, dramatic as it is, is further enlivened by

the authoress' own observations, often significant as glimpses of the human forces that make history.

And so the drama unfolds from the spring day in 1956 when, to the consternation of the old-line communist leadership, 5 deputies in the rubber-stamp Polish parliament voted against a government bill which they could not reconcile with their conscience (the 5 were Polish Catholics and the bill they objected to legalized abortion), through the Poznan riot, to 19 October when Gomulka faced up to Krushchev himself in a last, great showdown. There the story really ends, although the authoress briefly deals with the aftermath which saw Gomulka warily edging away from the heady liberalism of the first days of his rule. Even so, Flora Lewis is convinced that the revolution was not in vain, that through it Poland has reached "a kind of plateau, far above the dark past, far below the hopes for the future." In its present condition Poland remains a beacon light, feeble perhaps but recognizable, for the other downtrodden nations of eastern Europe to follow.

Flora Lewis has no doubt about what the future will bring to an empire balanced on the tips of Russian bayonets: "To an American in eastern Europe, it is obvious that the question is no longer: will there be a change? The whole meaning of these last years is that change cannot be averted. The question is how: in peace or in violence?" To read her remarkable book is to prepare oneself for the momentous events which she is so clearly and so convincingly foretelling.

Reviewed by WCmdr J. Gellner

Ed: WCmdr Gellner, a retired RCAF officer, is a well known author and lecturer. He lives in Toronto.



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